[EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

[robert bristow-johnson]

On Nov 16, 2010, at 8:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:

> robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>> On Nov 15, 2010, at 8:40 PM, Bob Richard wrote:
>>> On 11/15/2010 4:58 PM, fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:
>>>> When majority rules, a 51 percent majority can have their way in  
>>>> election after election. But what other
>>>> possible standard is there for democracy and fairness besides  
>>>> "majority rule?"
>>>
>>> For seats in legislative bodies, proportional representation.
>> for which STV or a more Condorcet-like ordering (what would the  
>> name of that be? Kristofer Munsterhjelm had a Schulze ordering for  
>> Oakland) does well. here in Vermont we just had an election where  
>> for my state senate district, we voted for 6 out of about 15 and  
>> the top 6 vote getters win seats, but that method sorta sucks.
>
> Condorcet doesn't give proportional representation. If you have an  
> example like:
>
> 51: D1 > D2 > D3 > D4
> 49: R1 > R2 > R3 > R4
>
> and pick the first four, all the Ds will win.

good point.  maybe STV would be better for proportionality.

>> for me, if it's a single winner: "If a majority of voters select  
>> Candidate A over Candidate B then, if at all possible, Candidate B  
>> should not be elected" is the only sensible rule, because of the  
>> converse is so clearly contrary to the concept of the will of the  
>> majority.  Any method that cannot be guaranteed to accomplish that  
>> risks the question: e.g. "Why should Bob Kiss be the mayor of  
>> Burlington when 587 more voters expressed on their ballots that  
>> they thought Andy Montroll was a better choice?".
>> i think you can argue that Condorcet compliant is always preferable  
>> out of point by contradiction.  if there is a CW and you elect  
>> someone else, that is always a failure.
>
> I think counterarguments would make use of that the majorities are  
> not necessarily the same. Those who see no point in Condorcet would  
> say: "if the leftists prefer A to B and the right-wingers prefer A  
> to C, that's still short of majority rule".

so let's pick B or C even though a majority of voters (neither  
specifically left or right) vote that A is the better choice over  
either B or C.  the reason why Condorcet (assuming a CW exists) is the  
democratic choice has nothing to do with left or right political  
alignment.  the problem with electing someone other than the CW is  
that we, the voters, by a majority have expressed that we want the  
CW.  otherwise, why not use random chance, or just give the election  
to the *minority* candidate?

here's a fundamental philosophical question: why is it better, even in  
a two-candidate race, to elect the majority winner?  why not have  
rules that we elect the minority candidate?  (i have my own answers,  
but i would be interested in reading some others.)

--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."