[EM] Why I Think Sincere Cycles are Extremely Unlikely in

[Juho]

On Nov 16, 2010, at 12:03 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:

> Hi Forest,
>
> --- En date de : Lun 15.11.10, fsimmons at pcc.edu <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a  
> écrit :
>> De: fsimmons at pcc.edu <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
>> Objet: Re: [EM] Why I Think Sincere Cycles are Extremely Unlikely in
>> À: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>> Date: Lundi 15 novembre 2010, 15h38
>>
>>> From: Juho
>>
>> [snip].
>>
>>> On the other hand we know that all Condorcet methods
>> are
>>> vulnerable at
>>> least to the burying strategy.
>>
>> All Condorcet Methods?  Or all deterministic Condorcet
>> Methods?
>
> I would say all... LNHelp is basically a subset of a "burial  
> resistance"
> criterion and you can't get a Condorcet method to satisfy LNHelp even
> using randomness.
>
> You may come up with something that in practice is very difficult to  
> try
> to game (and we do try), but there's no invulnerability.
>
> Kevin

My thoughts go to this example.

1: A>B>C
1: B>C>A
1: C>A>B

This is a three-way tie for all methods that satisfy some very basic  
criteria.

The first voter is the only strategic voter. Her sincere vote would be  
A>C>B. C is the sincere Condorcet winner. The first voter may thus  
improve the expected outcome by burying C under B if she prefers  
random choice between A, B and C to electing C.

Juho