[EM] My Favorite Deterministic Condorcet Efficient Method: TACC

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Kristofer,

--- En date de : Mar 9.11.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no> a écrit :
> Would this method be any good if "Approval" was changed
> into some other method that's burial resistant and monotone,
> like Plurality or Bucklin?

Bucklin maybe, but the trick seems to be that it's hard to bury without
altering approval order. In a cycle TACC elects the candidate who defeats
the approval loser. I doubt there are any scenarios where burial succeeds
whether or not the final approval order is changed.

I'm not fond of the minimal defense failure... It seems to me the
"train wreck" disincentive to defect is more likely to lead to favorite
betrayal (and nomination disincentive) than cooperation.

That is:

49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore

If this is a Bush win, and people think the votes might actually look like
this, it takes much less convincing to make the Nader voters create a
Gore win via compromising, than to make Gore voters add tons of Nader 
second preferences. It's not even clear here that Gore voters are
interested in Nader, in which case a Bush win is purely a favorite 
betrayal incentive.

One might argue that Nader voters won't compromise when Nader seems
stronger. But if Gore voters are reluctant to vote for Nader (no matter
what the reason is), Nader isn't stronger in any meaningful way. He can't
win the election.

Kevin