[EM] minimizing reluctance by DSV

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

You are over looking the fact that X is the approval cutoff on all of the ballots, including the ones on which X is not approved.

----- Original Message -----
From: Jameson Quinn 
Date: Monday, May 24, 2010 11:27 am
Subject: Re: [EM] minimizing reluctance by DSV
To: fsimmons at pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com

> 2010/5/24 
> 
> >
> > Hi Forest,
> >
> > --- En date de : Sam 22.5.10, fsimmons at pcc.edu > pcc.edu> a
> > écrit :
> > > The alternative X is used as the approval cutoff. On
> > > some of the ballots the
> > > cutoff is considered excluded (not including X as approved)
> > > but on just enough
> > > ballots to make X the approval winner, the cutoff is
> > > considered inclusive (so on
> > > these ballots X is approved).
> > >
> > > The "reluctance" of ballot B in approving X is the
> > > difference between the
> > > maxrange value and the rating given to alternative X by
> > > ballot B.
> > >
> > > Elect the alternative X with the least possible reluctance
> > > total.
> >
> > I don't understand how you determine which ballots approve X. 
> Is it
> > random, or irrelevant? Or do you have to find the selection 
> which will
> > minimize reluctance to electing X?
> >
> > Kevin
> >
> > Forest replies:
> >
> > Yes, the selection that minimizes reluctance. That’s why I 
> put the word
> > “possible” in the
> > phrase, “minimum possible reluctance.”
> >
> > Start by approving X on all of the ballots with zero 
> reluctance for X, then
> > move on to the ballots that have
> > a reluctance of one, etc. until there is enough approval for X 
> to overcome
> > the approval for the candidates
> > that are preferred over X .
> >
> >
> Um, wouldn't that just be plurality? That is, you'd start with zero
> reluctance, and the plurality leader would win. That would 
> automaticallybeat any win with nonzero reluctance.
> 
> I think you mean, then, to "Elect the alternative X with the 
> least possible
> reluctance total for a majority win". That system is some kind 
> of hybrid
> between Abd's Range/Bucklin proposal and a Condorcet method. I 
> like it - but
> it is basically a non-starter until you have an explicit 
> algorithm for
> finding the correct winner.
> 
> JQ
> 
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