[EM] Burlington Vermont repeals IRV 52% to 48%
rbj at audioimagination.com
Sat Mar 6 12:31:31 PST 2010
On Mar 6, 2010, at 2:34 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
> On Sat, Mar 6, 2010 at 1:34 AM, robert bristow-johnson
> <rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>> i almost never vote for all 6. usually just 2. but it's a
>> strategic vote. and since i didn't hit the limit, it's
>> practically no different than Approval voting. i cannot see how
>> Warren and company claim that it's less strategic than Condorcet.
> Assuming 6 seats, optimal strategy is probably to approve either the
> 6th or 7th most popular candidate and all candidates you prefer to
> that candidate. If you run out of votes, the you should approve
> candidates who are most likely to tie for the 6th seat first before
> other candidates.
> In any case, you really should cast all 6 votes.
i don't get it. just because the party i most identify with proffers
6 candidates (as does two or three other parties) doesn't mean that
i, as a independently-minded voter, care if all of those candidates
are elected. if i "approve" of *all* of those candidates, it's only
because of blind party affiliation.
but what if there is *one* (or maybe two) of those candidates that i
take an affirmative interest in seeing elected? that is, i would
really like to see that one candidate elected more than i would want
to see any other candidate, including those others in my party that i
*might* have tepid approval for. i know that, even being in the same
party, those other candidates *are* effectively running against the
candidate i like. it's not just the candidate from the other parties
that are running against my preferred candidate. voting for *any*
other candidate (by me or by any other voter) independently of the
party that other candidate is from, reduces the likelihood of my
preferred candidate getting elected.
i know that if my candidate *is* elected, 5 other candidates will
also be elected but i have much less interest in who those 5 will
be. or, i might recognize some of those candidates to be shoe-ins
and that they'll likely be elected from the support they are
receiving elsewhere. so, if that were the political interests i am
bringing to the polls, why would i choose to harm the chances of this
candidate i really like, by approving any other candidate?
i actually think that, even in a multi-winner election, that
Condorcet ordering of the candidates could make sense (with the top 6
preferred candidates elected). of course there is a problem if there
is a cycle that is transected by the cutoff boundary of the top 6 who
get elected and those lower who do not. i am not seriously proposing
actually implementing this without some serious study, and a good
method (perhaps Ranked Pairs or Schulze) would be needed to deal with
a cycle that crosses the win/lose boundary.
that said, Approval voting requires more strategy from me than just
ranking candidates in my preferred order. whether it's a single or
multi-winner election, i really think that the ranked ballot is the
simplest way to extract necessary information from voters, without
expecting too much from voters (which is what Range or Score voting
r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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