[EM] Burlington Vermont repeals IRV 52% to 48%

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Fri Mar 5 19:00:10 PST 2010

On Mar 5, 2010, at 8:34 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> On Mar 5, 2010, at 8:17 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>> On Mar 4, 2010, at 1:04 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>> ...
>>> so, i'm for Condorcet too.  i am sorta agnostic about what to do  
>>> about a cycle (because i really doubt it will happen at all often  
>>> in reality) as long as it's a sensible resolution (Shulze would be  
>>> okay if it was easy for a layman to understand, so probably Ranked  
>>> Pairs is the simplest, but i might just say give it to the  
>>> Plurality winner in the Smith set to toss the IRV haters a bone).
> ...
> i like Ranked Pairs best, too.  and if the Smith Set are three  
> candidates, it and Shulze pick the same winner.

Matters more that it needs to be explainable in a sales pitch.  Fine  
tuning can wait til later unless there is a major reason why it should  
come up front.
>> Bringing Plurality in would be a distraction, since we have no need  
>> to go near this method and risk a worse answer.
> it's a "worse answer" in a weird circumstance where an argument  
> could be made that any in the Smith set have some reasonable claim  
> or legitimacy to be elected.  why not the guy with the most votes?

Agreed that all in the Smith set get there by looking good to some.   
Seems unhealthy to say anything nice about Plurality in a sales  
pitch.  As I say below, loading the N*N matrix does not require  
knowing who Plurality should pick in this event.
>>  Further, our calculating has not necessarily identified which  
>> cycle member would win this (though my method of doing the N*N  
>> matrix does provide this).
>> BTW - we should not discourage bullet voting - we should NOT  
>> encourage voters to go beyond their desires, doing what is really  
>> nonsense ranking.
> i don't think Condorcet encourages bullet voting at all.

IRV, in our prospects' past, certainly discourages bullet voting -  
seems to me their goal is making the numbers prettier rather than  
helping voters attain their goals.  Our goals are more into helping  
voters attain their goals with minimum effort on their part (note that  
I suggest voters should stop as their desires indicate - neither  
before nor after).
> but i *do* think that Approval *does* suggest the possibility of  
> bullet voting.  even though we're limited to 6 in my county, the  
> weird way that the Vermont State Senate is elected is that all state  
> senators are elected at large in your county.  so then more populous  
> counties have more state senators than smaller ones (they all get at  
> least 1).  anyway, we vote for up to six out of a zillion candidates  
> since each party proffers 6 candidates, we have Progs and Greens,  
> and there are independents.  the six candidates with the most votes  
> are elected.  what if there is one, maybe two candidates that you  
> really think should be elected?  i almost never vote for all 6.   
> usually just 2.  but it's a strategic vote.  and since i didn't hit  
> the limit, it's practically no different than Approval voting.  i  
> cannot see how Warren and company claim that it's less strategic  
> than Condorcet.

Approval's excuse for living is to allow voting for more than one,  
without encouraging or demanding doing such.

Condorcet is not ready to get involved in the 6 you describe above.   
In electing a mayor or governor approving A+B+C would be less  
strategic than indicating your preferences by rank, such as A>B>C.
> r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

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