[EM] Condocet with many candidates - two round elections considered
Juho
juho.laatu at gmail.com
Wed Jun 16 08:03:47 PDT 2010
All common Condorcet methods work fine also with multiple candidates
(although not all methods meet exactly the same criteria). The first
problem are probably human behaviour related, i.e. people start hating
the voting process if it is too tedious, and they may not rank all
relevant candidates, and that may lead to some distortion in the
results.
Juho
On Jun 16, 2010, at 5:51 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Peter,
>
> --- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik <pzbornik at gmail.com> a
> écrit :
>> thanks for your view on the topic.
>> In election-theoretic language, what criterion is used to describe,
>> that a
>> method performs as well with many as with few candidates?
>> There is a list of criterias in the table
>> at:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Comparison_with_other_prefer
>> ential_single-winner_election_methods, but I don't know which it is
>> (clone-
>> independence? Maybe some other criterion too?).
>
> Unfortunately this is a difficult criterion to try to define.
> Independence
> of clones is probably the best one. It says performance won't degrade
> by cloning candidates or consolidating a set of clones into one
> candidate.
> But it doesn't say anything about what happens if you just add a lot
> of
> unrelated candidates.
>
> Actually the criterion there called "Independence of Smith-dominated
> alternatives" is helpful also as it means that every candidate in the
> election either has a beatpath to every other candidate, or else has
> no effect on the outcome.
>
> Kevin Venzke
>
>
>
>
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