[EM] A four bit (sixteen slot) range style ballot

[Kevin Venzke]

Another thing it occurs to me to note:

> --- En date de : Lun 14.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> > Approval passes ordinary Majority. If a certain
> candidate
> > (or set) is approved by a majority of the voters, any
> > candidate that has a hope of beating it must also be
> > approved by a majority.

If you interpret Approval such that multiple approved candidates means
multiple candidates tied in first, then Approval satisfies Majority
because it is impossible (in any method) for more than one candidate to be
the strict first preference of a majority.

It seems to me you have to interpret Majority to be referring to strict
first preferences only, else methods like Schulze will fail it:

33 A>B
33 A=B
34 C>B

Here only A has a majority of "top" preferences but the Condorcet winner
is B.

Kevin