[EM] A four bit (sixteen slot) range style ballot

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Sun Jun 13 21:45:03 PDT 2010


At 10:09 AM 6/13/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:

>--- En date de : Sam 12.6.10, Abd ul-Rahman 
>Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
>
> > Plurality allows voters to place a candidate at the "top of
> > their preference listings."
>
>That is inadequate to satisfy the criterion, which refers to candidates
>plural. Woodall's Majority is equal to what has been called "Mutual
>Majority" on this list.

Sure. It's more general in application than the 
simple restatements of the Majority Criterion. 
However, the plural includes the singular.

What I see with Plurality is that if a majority 
of voters put the same set of candidates at the 
top of their preference listings, on the ballot, 
that candidate will win. That they only put one 
candidate doesn't violate or negate that statement.

Below, Mr. Venzke provides a definition of 
preference listing, which considers it a ballot.

My point, though, is not to insist upon one 
particular interpretation, but to show that 
interpreting and applying a preferential voting 
criterion, as Woodall's Majority Criterion was 
intended to be, to a voting system that isn't 
constructed as expected, is not a way to 
objectively judge the system, because one then 
has to make a series of possibly biased judgments.

This really comes out when we start to examine 
Approval voting. If a majority of voters prefer a 
candidate over all others, showing that on the 
ballot, with Approval voting, that candidate must 
win. If they conceal this preference by also 
approving someone else, that candidate might 
lose. So ... does aproval voting satisfy this Majority Criterion?




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