[EM] Why Condorcet

[Juho]

On Jul 8, 2010, at 8:28 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

>
> Sorry to be so wordy here.  There are 3 different issues (the number  
> of ranking levels and the value of ballot access criteria, procedure  
> if Write-In wins, and visual effectiveness of the "pairwise defeats  
> matrix") to respond to:
>
> On Jul 7, 2010, at 9:56 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>> On Jul 6, 2010, at 11:31 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>>> On Jul 6, 2010, at 9:31 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>>
>>>> Ballots:  Must support write-ins and, perhaps, 3 ranks (do not  
>>>> need to rank rejects and can do equal ranking).
>>>
>>> i think that the number of ranking levels should be as large as  
>>> the number of candidates (and there should be ballot access laws  
>>> that make it difficult enough to get on the ballot that no more  
>>> than maybe 5 candidates normally get on).
>>
>> Making getting on the ballot unreasonably difficult affects who  
>> gets to run, unreasonably - lets don't.
>
> there is a question about what is reasonable.
>
>> No real need for a ranking level for every candidate.  Especially  
>> when there are many candidates voters will happily use some equal  
>> ranks and will not bother to rank those they see as not worth  
>> ranking.
>
> well, one of the complaints of the anti-IRVers (that applied more to  
> San Francisco and not to Burlington Vermont) was that, because the  
> number of candidates was much larger than the number of ranks, then  
> voters could not express a vote regarding every candidate.  if the  
> candidates that ended up leading the race (getting to the final and  
> semi-final rounds) were not any that the voter ranked (due partly to  
> the too few ranking levels), the claim was that this voter was  
> "disenfranchised".  i have her kill-filed, but i'm sure Kathy Dopp  
> can fill you in on what this sentiment is all about.  the funny  
> thing is that, while this "feature" of IRV (in SF) was a major  
> complaint of the IRV opponents, what the alternative offered (the  
> return to the affirmative vote for a single candidate and FPTP and/ 
> or delayed runoff) was even more so a "disenfranchisement" in that  
> very same manner.  it is equivalent to a ranked-order ballot but  
> with only one ranking level deep.
>
> also, sometimes a voter wants to bury a candidate.  how does one  
> vote negatively against a candidate when they cannot rank all the  
> other candidates above that one?  it's okay that all candidates not  
> ranked by a particular voters are tied for last place on their  
> ballots if that voter can lift all other candidates, not deemed the  
> absolute worst, above that level.

Do you mean that some voters want to bury candidates or do you want to  
offer this possibility to the voters? I think in most cases burying is  
harmful to the method and voters should be discouraged to vote that  
way (i.e. rank some strong candidates insincerely lower than their  
sincere ranking is).

Juho




>
> similarly to voter registration and ballot access to voters being a  
> political question, i think that ballot access to candidates is also  
> a political question.  reasonable people can disagree, but i see a  
> future with political parties to be inevitable.  it doesn't mean  
> that we should have only two viable parties nor that independent  
> candidates cannot credibly run for office.
>
> but any candidate that deserves the ink and real estate on the  
> ballot for their name, should be required to demonstrate some level  
> of electoral support to get there.  if the race is broad enough (a  
> national election in a large country), some candidate need not be on  
> the ballot for every state or district within that nation, if the  
> candidate cannot satisfy the qualifying threshold (in petition  
> signatures) for every district.  but whatever the size of the  
> election venue, be it a city ward, entire city, legislative  
> district, statewide, whatever, there should be a minimum number of  
> signatures required for ballot access that is approximately  
> proportional to the voter population of that venue.  that constant  
> of proportionality would have to be experimentally and empirically  
> determined, but it should be made high enough to reduce the  
> candidate field to about half dozen meaningful candidates.
>
> since that number would be fixed in law in advance of the race,  
> there could certainly be election flukes where many more candidates  
> satisfy the ballot access criteria and, in that case, the number of  
> ranking levels would be much less than the number of candidates, but  
> that would be a fluke.  if it turned out to become common, the  
> ballot access threshold should be raised by legislative action.
>
>
>>> i think Write-In can just be considered another candidate.
>>
>> Agreed each should be, and my way of counting provides for this.   
>> Counters can hear before election day of likely need.
>
> one thing, i don't think it would be so good if the election *law*  
> pays any respect about who is a merely *reputed* viable write-in  
> candidate.  i would suggest that, since Condorcet is precinct  
> summable, that after the polls close, the ward or precinct officials  
> transmit their pairwise subtotals up to the government seat to be  
> counted, but do not yet pack up until they hear from the central  
> authority that Write-In did not win.  if Write-In wins, they have to  
> separate all of the ballots where Write-In is the likely leading  
> candidate and all others, but just because the newspapers are saying  
> that some write-in candidate is a significant figure, that should  
> not be the basis of the procedure provided in law.
>
> because, if Write-In wins, there would have to be a lot of ballots  
> that have Write-In marked.  i would suggest that each precinct draw  
> ballots at random from the stack, examining each Write-In name and  
> the first name to get to 10 (or some other threshold) write-ins of  
> the same name, that name would be identified as the likely write-in  
> leader.  then they would have to separate all ballots with that name  
> as Write-In from all other ballots.  then they can run the two piles  
> of ballots through the counting machines separately, zeroing the  
> pairwise totals between each run.  for all other candidate pairs not  
> involving Write-In, they can sum the vote totals (and that should  
> equal the pairwise vote totals they had before), but Write-In for  
> the first pile (where Write-In is a specific person's name) would be  
> a different candidate than the other Write-In.  they can report  
> those totals (and the name of the primary write-in candidate that  
> they separated) up to the central election authority who then reruns  
> the totals for each Condorcet pair and *then* they can see if this  
> specific write-in candidate continues to win.  if this Write-In  
> doesn't quite win and some precincts had one name as their primary  
> write-in and other precincts had a different name, the election  
> officials at the central authority would have to determine (by venue- 
> wide vote counts) which Write-In is the more significant candidate  
> and communicate to all precincts to separate ballots according to  
> that name and then run the totals again.  if that same Write-In  
> (where all precincts assumed that name and separated ballots as  
> such) doesn't win, someone else is the Condorcet winner or there is  
> a cycle.
>
> of course, if Write-In doesn't win, it doesn't matter who Write-In  
> is, and all this would not be necessary.
>
>>    Near here, a few years ago, someone's error resulted in no  
>> petitions being submitted on time.  Recovery was to do entire  
>> election with write-ins.
>
> no candidates but multiple write-ins?  how would we prepare law in  
> advance for that contingency?  perhaps, if the number of candidates  
> gaining ballot access (having met the threshold of signatures) is  
> equal to or greater than the (fixed) number of ranking levels minus  
> one, then only one line for Write-In would be on the ballot.  but if  
> the number of registered candidates is less than that, there would  
> be that many more Write-In slots so a voter could write in more than  
> one candidate and rank them against each other.  the number of  
> ranking levels would remain the same.
>
>>> the only issue is what to do if Write-In wins, then there must be  
>>> some assumption first to determine who the likely write-in  
>>> candidate is, hand separate those ballots from the others with a  
>>> write-in (and call them two different candidates, Write-In1 and  
>>> Write-In2).  and then retabulate as a Condorcet election and see  
>>> if Write-In1 still wins.
>
> oops, i guess i already said this.
>
>>> i still think that rectangular N*N matrix is sorta useless.  it's  
>>> hard to read.  each pair should be grouped together for visual  
>>> inspection.
>>
>> Debatable.
>
> i guess it is, but i just cannot see how this:
>
>
>         M        K        W        S        H
>      ------------------------------------------
>  M  |          4064     4597     4570     6263
>  K  | 3477              4313     3944     5515
>  W  | 3664     4061              3971     5270
>  S  | 2997     3576     3793              5570
>  H  |  591      844     1310      721
>
>
>   ... is as easy to inspect and extract meaning as this:
>
>  M 4064
>  K 3477
>
>  M 4597     K 4313
>  W 3664     W 4061
>
>  M 4570     K 3944     W 3971
>  S 2997     S 3576     S 3793
>
>  M 6263     K 5515     W 5270     S 5570
>  H  591     H  844     H 1310     H  721
>
> the numbers are only meaningful in their respective pairs.  why not  
> group the pairs together?
>
>
> --
>
> r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
>
>
>
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