[EM] IRV vs Plurality
Juho
juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Wed Jan 27 15:55:41 PST 2010
On Jan 27, 2010, at 11:47 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> Without the uneven strategy problem, "full-blown Range" would be,
> hands down, the best (single-winner) voting system possible
Would you be happy with fixed range ballots (e.g. 0 - 99) or should
one allow any integer to be used ( -infinity - infinity )?
If one uses a fixed range should all voters then normalize their
ratings (worst=0, best=99) or use a narrower scale (e.g. worst=40,
best=85) if their feelings about the candidates are not very strong?
Should one determine some reference points for the voters (e.g. less
than 10 = not accepted, 90 = excellent) to make sure that the given
ratings are comparable? (this is more important if the range is
infinite)
Is the sum of votes (or average) really what one wants or should one
aim at providing about equal results to all, or maybe try to keep the
worst results to individual voters as high as possible (40,40,40 vs.
0,60,60)?
Would there still be electons where we would want to decide based on
majority and breadth of opposition, or should all elections follow the
"sum of utilities" pholosophy?
My point is maybe that if we would get rid of the strategy related
problems we would be well off but we might then move towards solving
more detailed problems, performance with sincere votes and other
problems that are just noise today. On the other hand we do have also
(almost) strategy free environments/elections/polls today, so our
selection of decision making (or utility measuring) algorithms should
cover also them.
Juho
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