[EM] Range strategy pathological example (was Re: IRV vs Plurality)

[Jonathan Lundell]

On Jan 26, 2010, at 8:41 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 02:53 PM 1/26/2010, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 
>> ... a lot of hot air about "strategic voting" in Range.
>> Here's the nightmare scenario:
> 
> Thanks for an opportunity to address this, it's a very common misconception about Range.
> 
>> True (normalized) utilities:
>> 20% voters: 10 Ader, 7 Bore, 0 Cush
>> 20% voters: 8 Ader, 10 Bore, 0 Cush
>> 20% voters: 0 Ader, 10 Bore, 8 Cush
>> 40% voters: 0 Ader, 8 Bore, 10 Cush
> 
> Okay, but there are several things not specified. One is voter knowledge. Are these blind voters who have no idea of what others think, or are they more like real voters, who do know the actual political situation more or less?

Perhaps we can assume that they are like most voters. Some of them read newspapers and polls, and have an idea of what's going on (like there's no way that Coakley can lose to Brown, say). Others might get a few seconds of coverage from Fox (McCain can't lose) or MSNBC or CNN. And perhaps a plurality don't really have a clue what the likely outcome is.