[EM] IRV vs Plurality

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Tue Jan 26 14:00:22 PST 2010


Hi,

--- En date de : Mar 26.1.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
> Range voting is interesting
> precisely because it bases outcomes on a metric for election
> performance, and the only issue is a lot of hot air about
> "strategic voting" in Range.
> 
> My view on this is simple: strategic voting in Range
> expresses real preference strength. In other words, it's an
> oxymoron, created by an assumption that when a voter
> "exaggerates," the voter doesn't really care that much. But
> how much we care always depends on our perception of
> realities.

Well, this is just a change of terminology. You can say that Range 
relatively has strategic incentive to exaggerate, or you can say
that in Range the "sincere vote" is relatively dependent on voters'
perceptions of which candidates are viable. Either way this will be
often be regarded as a disadvantage.

Kevin Venzke


      



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