[EM] IRV vs Plurality (back to the pile count controversy)

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com
Fri Jan 22 19:04:57 PST 2010


On Jan 22, 2010, at 8:56 PM, robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com 
 > wrote:

>
>>
> being 54 and having voted in every prez election since Carter-Ford  
> (and aware of the 1968 election with Wallace-Nixon-Humphery), i have  
> never once seen a presidential election in the US that had more than  
> two candidates with any chance of winning, and no more than three  
> candidates of national salience.

Nobody is talking about a US presidential election using IRV. Those  
are state elections of electors. That is one election every 4 years.  
There are how many single-winner elections in that period? 100,000?
>
> so my bogus number is 3, maybe 4 at the most.  individual precincts  
> could total 40 different virtual piles.

That is about the minimum, and even that could fail. A voting system  
must handle the worst case. Proof of the pudding: no IRV election has  
been handled through precinct summation.

> doesn't matter what the counting method is, those precinct summable  
> pile tallies are sufficient to completely describe the election for  
> those 4.

Not if a majority is required. And not if one of the four is a write- 
in category and the sum of write-in votes turns out to be more than  
the votes for the last of the three ballot candidates.

>
>>
>>>>>  for 3 candidates, that number is 9.
>>>>
>>>> Okay, three candidates, A, B, C, the ballot possibilities are, to
>>>> be complete, much more than 9. I'll assume that write-ins are
>>>> illegal and void the ballot. Some of the possibilities are legally
>>>> equivalent to others, and in actual IRV ballot imaging, they are
>>>> collapsed and reported the same, to the displeasure of voting
>>>> security people who do want to know the "error rate," which
>>>> includes overvoting and exact overvoting patterns. So-called ballot
>>>> images are not, generally. They are processed data reducing a
>>>> ballot to legally equivalent votes. The reduced set is this:
>>>>
>>>> A
>>>> B
>>>> C
>>>> A>B
>>>> A>C
>>>> B>A
>>>> B>C
>>>> C>A
>>>> C>B
>>>>
>>>> Note that this assumes a 2-rank ballot.
>>>
>>> no, it can be a 3-rank ballot where the voter declines to rate their
>>> last choice.  "3rd choice" is left unmarked.
>>
>> I meant something a little different. I address the possibility of  
>> a 3-rank ballot in the next section. The basic issue here is  
>> whether or not the third rank is irrelevant or not. If it's  
>> irrelevant, I claim, it's not really a three-rank ballot, it's got  
>> two relevant ranks and one that means nothing. Why was it even there?
>>
>
> blather.  you said absolutely nothing of substance.

I'll let the readers judge that.

>
>>>> It also assumes that majority vote isn't important.
>>>
>>> bullshit.  it (the number of consequential ballot permutations) has
>>> nothing to do with it (whether or not majority vote is important).
>>
>> This is, in fact, serious ignorance. Bullshit, properly used,  
>> allows things to grow. Consider where the growth lies here.
>>
>> If a majority is required, there is a difference in meaning between  
>> B>C>A and B>C. I will assume the counting method described by  
>> Robert's Rules of Order for preferential voting. 3 candidates
>>
>> Situation with truncated B vote:
>> 35 A>B
>> 34 B>C
>> 31 C
>>
>> C eliminated, votes become
>>
>> 35 A>B
>> 34 B
>>
>> Majority basis is 100. 51 votes are required to win. No majority, B  
>> eliminated. I would guess that Robert doesn't consider this step  
>> because he is used to thinking of plurality IRV, no majority  
>> required, and the counting can stop with the last two in that case.  
>> A would win.
>>
>> 35 A>B. A is plurality winner, no majority, election fails. Who  
>> would be the runoff candidates? Under Robert's Rules, the question  
>> is unanswerable and undeterminable from the first round results.  
>> It's a new election. Under top two runoff rules, the rules were not  
>> designed for a preferential ballot, but I'd suggest considering  
>> *every IRV vote* as an approval, then pick the top two in that.
>
> so you're making up rules to "prove" a point.  chapter 13, section  
> 45 of RONR (regarding preferential voting) have *no* consequential  
> difference between marking the last preference last or deducing the  
> same preference is last because it is the *only* one remaining  
> unmarked.

You don't understand the rules. And you aren't paying attention to  
what others have written here. RRONR elections as described continue  
elimination until a majority is found. So it doesn't stop at the two  
last. Majority, under the rules, is a majority of non-blank ballots.  
So an A>B>C>D ballot is different from an A>B>C ballot. Let's look
>
> there is no consequential difference between.
>
>  35  A>B
>  34  B>C
>  31  C

Majority is 51.
1. 35 A, 34 B
2. 35 A, majority failure, election must be repeated.

Richie and Bouricius have tried to cover this up with various  
smokescreens but the manual is explicit, the election must be repeated.

>
> and
>
>  35  A>B
>  34  B>C>A
>  31  C

1. 31 A, 34 B.
2. 69 A, A wins with a majority.

And so he or she should. Don't vote for a candidate unless you are  
prepared to cause that candidate to win. The 3rd rank vote is not what  
you thought. It is not a vote against A. It is a conditional vote for  
A. It also harms the favorite, who might win a repeated election. So  
majority-required IRV fails LNH.

FairVote has lied to you, and you still believe it.

I just read it again today. The propaganda claims that RRO recommends  
IRV. But what they describe (and also criticise) requires a majority.  
It is not a runoff substitute. As such, it's a better method, though  
still defective.

>
> or
>
>  35  A>B>C
>  34  B>C>A
>  31  C
>
> end of discussion.

1. 35 A, 34 B
2. 69 A, A wins with majority.

This may not make sense to you because you don't realize how IRV would  
actually be used. The ballots are blank pieces of paper. The voters  
write the names of candidates in order, all those they wish to vote for.

>
>> Pay attention, Robert, there is far more here than you imagine.
>
> the problem for you is that i *am* paying attention.  you're wrong  
> and, by examination, that fact that you're wrong becomes manifest.

To whom?

Did you read the rules? Hint: I know them well and checked them  
anyway. Most of what you'd need to know is on a FairVote page. The  
inroduction is misleading, but the rules are there. Read the whole  
thing. Every part is important.

> the rest of the blather is deleted without comment.

No comment is better than stupid comment.

> people need to warned that, although you fancy yourself an expert,  
> you are not.  you make things up.  they should just ignore you.

They don't. Think you can convince them? How well is that working here?

Am I an expert? Compared to what?

>





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