[EM] I need an example of Condorcet method being subjected
Kathy Dopp
kathy.dopp at gmail.com
Thu Jan 21 16:48:37 PST 2010
On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 7:34 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
<abd at lomaxdesign.com> wrote:
> At 04:41 PM 1/21/2010, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>>
>> On Jan 21, 2010, at 1:32 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
>>
>> > Terry, You cleverly conveniently change all the definitions whenver it
>> > is necessary to make yourself and Fairytale Vote right on the "facts".
>>
>> Define "spoiler", please, unambiguously.
>
> The term has usage, and must be understood from that. A formal definition,
> nailing it down, would be arbitrary. But Kathy's definition is one
> reasonable one that matches common usage.
>
> But there is another which is broader and, to distinguish this from the
Abd ul, actually your definition below is *narrower* not broader,
because it narrows the number of cases that fit the definition. I
simply took my broader definition that includes all cases of
nonwinning candidates who alter election outcomes by their presence,
from Arrow's fairness criteria which is describes less simply here:
"Arrow's Fairness Criteria"
http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/Voting/whatdowe.htm#The%20Independence%20of%20Irrelevant%20Alternatives%20Criterion
So you see that my definition is actually Arrow's definition of
spoiler, not my own original definition.
Kathy
> common usage, I call the common usage the "first order spoiler effect." It
> refers to minor candidates, with hopelessly low support, who alter the
> outcome between two major candidates by drawing away votes preferentially
> from one, from voters who would otherwise vote for that one. The application
> most common is with plurality, but also top-two runoff and, similarly, IRV,
> where as little as one vote and some back luck in the resolution of a tie
> can cause the effect.
>
> To define this l.e. spoiler effect more crisply would be arbitrary.
>
> But then there is a more generalized "spoiler effect," more commonly
> referred to as center squeeze. It's a spoiler effect, all right, in
> substance, because an extremist candidates, who would lose in a direct
> contest between either the centrist or the other extremist, draws enough
> higher preference votes away from the centrist to reduce that centrist below
> second rank in first preference. So this is an IIA problem.
>
--
Kathy Dopp
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
phone 518-952-4030
cell 518-505-0220
http://utahcountvotes.org
http://electionmathematics.org
http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/
Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf
Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf
Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling
http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf
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