[EM] Fw: Two simple alternative voting methods that are fairerthan IRV/STV and lack most IRV/STV flaws

Sun Jan 17 11:10:54 PST 2010

On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 1:54 PM, Terry Bouricius
<terryb at burlingtontelecom.net> wrote:
> Kathy,
>
> You still have it wrong. You wrote "To clarify, what I meant to say is
> that in Burlington, the IRV winner
> was the worst choice of a majority of voters *out of the three candidates
> who were viable*."

Yes. Sorry. Of the two strongest candidates then.

You're right.  Thanks for the correction.

Kathy

>
> No, among the top three the IRV winner, Kiss, was not less preferred than
> Wright. Both Kiss and Montroll were preferred by more voters over Wright.
> Among the "three candidates who were viable" it was the first round
> plurality leader, Wright, who was the Condorcet-loser, not Kiss.
>
> The real world choice in Burlington today is between plurality and IRV.
> You have stated, that in this case you prefer Plurality, which allows the
> Condorcet-loser to be declared the winner. I agree that there is a
> powerful intellectual case for a Condorcet solution, but that is not on
> the table (even though I helped Robert Bristow-Johnson try to get it into
> the hopper for consideration.) Condorcet, so far, has not been able to get
> any traction with folks in Burlington, or in any other jurisdiction in the
> world.
>
> Condorcet advocates may want to focus their attention on Aspen, where the
> risk is that ranked ballots may be abandoned, if IRV is repealed.
> Promoting Condorcet as an alternate direction to go there seems to be a
> natural for advocates.
>
> Terry Bouricius
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Kathy Dopp" <kathy.dopp at gmail.com>
> To: "Terry Bouricius" <terryb at burlingtontelecom.net>
> Cc: <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2010 1:38 PM
> Subject: Re: [EM] Fw: Two simple alternative voting methods that are
> fairerthan IRV/STV and lack most IRV/STV flaws
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 12:34 PM, Terry Bouricius
> <terryb at burlingtontelecom.net> wrote:
>> Kathy,
>>
>> you wrote<snip>
>> "...unlike with IRV where a majority may think that the
>> elected candidate is the worst choice, as happened in Burlington, VT
>> mayoral election."
>
> To clarify, what I meant to say is that in Burlington, the IRV winner
> was the worst choice of a majority of voters *out of the three
> candidates who were viable*.  There are many other voting methods that
> do not share that flaw with IRV/STV. In fact do any alternatives to
> plurality share that IRV/STV flaw?
>
>> <snip>
>> That is incorrect for Burlington, (the IRV winner was the "second"
>> Condorcet-winner if the actual Condorcet-winner is removed, and favored
>> above the other three candidates.) And it is a fundamental fact that the
>> IRV winner can never be a candidate that the majority think "is the
>> worst
>> choice." IRV can never elect the Condorcet-loser. The ultimate winner
>> must
>> be preferred above the other finalist in the last round of the tally.
>>
>> It is PLURALITY voting, which you support, that often DOES elect the
>> Condorcet-loser, who a majority agree is the worst choice.
>
> You are distorting the facts again Terry.  If you want to know what I
> support, ask or read my posts.  I clearly support plurality if the
> choice is between IRV/STV and plurality because IRV/STV are *much
> worse* than plurality in a variety of ways.  However, given the choice
> between plurality and virtually any other alternative voting method
> I've heard proposed on this list, I support the alternatives.
>
> Please try to stop making personal attacks and distorting the facts
> about people, whenever the facts on the issues are not on your side.
> It's not pretty Terry.
>
> Kathy
>
>>
>> Terry Bouricius
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Kathy Dopp" <kathy.dopp at gmail.com>
>> To: "Chris Benham" <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>; "EM"
>> <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>> Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2010 8:38 AM
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Fw: Two simple alternative voting methods that are
>> fairerthan IRV/STV and lack most IRV/STV flaws
>>
>>
>> Hi Chris,
>>
>> I respond to your claims below.
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 11:23 PM, Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Forwarded Message ----
>>> From: Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>>> Sent: Fri, 15 January, 2010 4:21:31 AM
>>> Subject: Two simple alternative voting methods that are fairer than
>>> IRV/STV and lack most IRV/STV flaws
>>>
>>> Kathy Dopp wrote (11 Jan 2010):
>>>
>>> <snip>
>>>
>>> "IRV/STV is fundamentally unfair because a large group of persons whose
>>> first choice loses, never has their 2nd choice counted, unlike some
>>> other voters. It's a highly inequitable method."
>>>
>>> <snip>
>>>
>>> Kathy Dopp wrote (13 Jan 2010):
>>>
>>> "For those who need a system for substituting for a top-two runoff
>>> election, I devised two fair methods to suggest to her that do not
>>> have all the flaws of IRV/STV. (They both may've been devised by
>>> others before me. My goal was to create a fair method without
>>> IRV/STV's flaws which solve the problem of one person/one vote which
>>> is necessary to get a voting method approved by US courts.
>>> ------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> I believe that these
>>> alternative systems (below) are also susceptible to the spoiler effect
>>> of a nonwinning candidate changing who wins the election, although I
>>> believe that there is a significant difference between the alternative
>>> methods below and plurality and IRV where a majority opposed candidate
>>> may win the election. In other words, I believe that the winner due to
>>> a spoiler in the alternative method below is more likely to be a
>>> majority
>>> favorite."
>>>
>>>
>>> If "majority opposed" means having a majority-strength pairwise loss,
>>> then there is no decisive method that assures that no such candidate
>>> can win.
>>
>> You could be right on that statement Chris. I wasn't thinking about
>> all the possibilities when I wrote the above.
>>
>>>
>>> I'm not sure what Kathy means by a "majority favorite". That phrase is
>>> usually taken to refer to a candidate that is strictly top-ranked by
>>> more
>>> than half the voters. The "Majority Favorite" criterion is met by IRV
>>> and
>>> Plurality among many others, but not by Borda or Range.
>>
>> Sorry. I should use the phrase Condorcet winner for what I mean.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "Both methods below solve the problem of every voter having a vote of
>>> value one and, unlike IRV, treat all voters alike by counting all
>>> their choices
>>>
>>> So, here are two possible methods that are fairer than IRV/STV and
>>> which are monotonic (unlike IRV/STV):
>>>
>>> 1. A rank choice ballot method:
>>>
>>> Any number of candidates may be running for office and any number
>>> allowed to be ranked on the ballot.
>>>
>>> Voter ranks one candidate vote =1
>>>
>>> Voter ranks two candidates, denominator is 1+2 = 3
>>> votes are worth 2/3 and 1/3 for first and second ranked candidates
>>>
>>> Voter ranks three candidates, denominator is 1+2+3=6
>>> votes are worth 3/6 and 2/6 and 1/6 for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice
>>> respectively
>>>
>>> Voter ranks four candidates, denominator is 1+2+3+4=10
>>> votes are worth 4/10, 3/10, 2/10, and 1/10 for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd and
>>> 4th choice respectively
>>>
>>> ETC. Just follow the same pattern"
>>>
>>> 51: A>B
>>> 40: B
>>> 09: C>A
>>>
>>>
>>> A: (51 x 2/3 = 34) + (9 x 1/3 = 3) = 37.
>>> B: (40 x 1 = 40) + (51 x 1/3 = 17) = 57
>>> C: (9 x 2/3) = 6.
>>>
>>> Kathy's proposed point score method here elects B in violation of
>>> Majority Favourite.
>>
>> Yes. But also notice that B is also a majority favorite in that 91
>> voters out of 100 prefer B over C and 40/100 prefer B strongly enough
>> to bullet vote, so the vast majority of voters should be happy with
>> this result, unlike with IRV where a majority may think that the
>> elected candidate is the worst choice, as happened in Burlington, VT
>> mayoral election.
>>
>>>
>>> Also of course if the A supporters had not ranked B then A would
>>> have won, a big violation of Later-no-Harm.
>>
>> Later-no-harm is a very bad feature of IRV that prevents IRV from
>> finding majority-favorite compromise candidates and tends to elect
>> extreme right or extreme left candidates. In any negotiation, it is
>> necessary to reveal the 2nd choices of all parties early on, not hide
>> 2nd choices entirely of some voters and never consider them at all
>> like IRV does to most voters in many elections.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "2. A point system where a total number of points per voter per contest
>>> may be allocated by the voter to any of the candidates running for
>>> office:
>>>
>>> Two candidates running for office, give all voters 2+1=3 votes to
>>> cast. They may cast all three votes for one candidate or split the
>>> votes any way between the two.
>>>
>>> Three candidates running for office, give all voters 3+2+1=6 votes to
>>> cast. They may cast all six votes for one candidate or split the votes
>>> any way they like between the three.
>>>
>>> Four candidates running for office, give all voters 4+3+2+1=10 votes
>>> to cast. They may cast all ten votes for one candidate or split the
>>> votes any way they like between the four.
>>>
>>> Five candidates running for office, give all voters 5+4+3+2+1=15 votes
>>> to cast. They may cast all 15 votes for one candidate or split the
>>> votes any way they like."
>>>
>>> This is effectively the same thing as the single-winner Cumulative
>>> Vote,
>>> and is likewise strategically equivalent to Plurality, but allowing
>>> voters
>>> to unwisely split up their votes mean that it also fails Majority
>>> Favorite.
>>
>> Yes. *Any* system that guarantees the principle of
>> "one-person/one-vote" as some US judges insist on, has the feature
>> that it encourages bullet voting. Notice that with IRV and some other
>> systems like Condorcet there is a wide variety on the number of votes
>> that voters may cast and have counted during the election. In
>> Condorcet, the voter may determine how many votes are cast and
>> counted. In IRV the voter determines how many votes are cast, but not
>> how many are counted since votes are not treated equally in IRV/STV.
>>
>>>
>>> 51: A2, B1, C0
>>> 40: B3, A0, C0
>>> 09: C2, A1, B0
>>>
>>> A: (51 x 2 = 104) + (9 x 1 = 9) = 113
>>> B: (40 x 3 = 120) + (51 x 1 = 51) = 171
>>> C: (9 x 2) = 18.
>>>
>>>
>>> "The advantage of these two methods over IRV/STV include:
>>>
>>> 1. easy to count, precinct-summable (unlike IRV)
>>>
>>> 2. fair, treats all voters' votes equally by counting all choices of
>>> each voter (unlike IRV)"
>>>
>>> I think judgements of "fair" (and "equitable") or not of a voting
>>> method
>>> should be based on their possible results, and not on some (presumably
>>> just aesthetic) prejudice about its algorithm.
>>
>> By "fair" I mean that all votes are treated equally for all voters.
>> I.e. all voters' 2nd choices would be counted equally. Because
>> IRV/STV are not fair, they disenfranchise some voters and produce
>> undesirable election results that a majority of voters oppose and
>> involuntarily prevent some voters from participating in the final
>> decision-making in the final round, etc.
>>
>>>
>>> "3. gives each voter a total of one vote total over the entire vote
>>> counting process satisfying the US courts (unlike IRV)"
>>>
>>> If IRV doesn't satisfy the US courts, then how come IRV is used in the
>>> US?
>>
>> Because the judges have been cleverly and grossly misled on the facts,
>> as they were in the most recent MN court case by FairVote. Also, the
>> attorney who spoke for the plaintiff was not very educated on all the
>> facts about IRV/STV, having also been misled by defendants, and should
>> have let the attorney who did all the research for the firm speak
>> instead.
>>
>>>
>>> "4. is monotonic -- preserves the right to cast a vote that has a
>>> positive affect on a candidate's chances of winning (unlike IRV.)
>>>
>>> 5. Allows all voters to participate in all the rounds since these
>>> methods require only one (1) round (unlike IRV)".
>>>
>>> <snip>
>>>
>>> I am sure the majority of voters whose favourite was A in my examples
>>> would be very pleased that they were "allowed to participate in all the
>>> rounds".
>>
>> The majority of voters whose favorite was A and whose 2nd choice was B
>> (you cleverly neglect to mention here) should have been very happy
>> that C did not win, as would have happened in IRV/STV (you also
>> neglect to mention.)
>>
>>>
>>> Is being "monotonic" more important than satisfying Majority Favorite?
>>
>> Your definition of "majority favorite" of course conveniently only
>> considers a voters' first choice votes and only considers the first
>> choice votes of voters whose candidates make it to the final counting
>> rounds.
>>
>> All US jurisdictions who've adopted IRV/STV have had to drop their
>> requirement for majority winners when majority is defined, as it is in
>> common parlance, by a majority out of all voters who cast ballots in
>> the election. In Australia that may be different because Australia
>> may be able to require that voters fully rank all candidates. US law
>> does not permit that.
>>
>>>
>>> Why does Kathy elsewhere defend Top Two Runoff which isn't monotonic?
>>
>> Another highly misleading statement. In Top-two runoff each election
>> is monotonic and voters thus retain the right to cast a vote that
>> increases, rather than decreases, the chance of their candidates'
>> winning, unlike IRV/STV which removes this right, among others.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Kathy
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Chris Benham
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> Kathy Dopp
>>
>> Town of Colonie, NY 12304
>> phone 518-952-4030
>> cell 518-505-0220
>>
>> http://utahcountvotes.org
>> http://electionmathematics.org
>> http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/
>>
>> Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
>> http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf
>>
>> Voters Have Reason to Worry
>> http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf
>>
>> Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling
>> http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Kathy Dopp
>
> Town of Colonie, NY 12304
> phone 518-952-4030
> cell 518-505-0220
>
> http://utahcountvotes.org
> http://electionmathematics.org
> http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/
>
> Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
> http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf
>
> Voters Have Reason to Worry
> http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf
>
> Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling
> http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf
>
>

-- 

Kathy Dopp

Town of Colonie, NY 12304
phone 518-952-4030
cell 518-505-0220

http://utahcountvotes.org
http://electionmathematics.org
http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/

Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf

Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf

Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling
http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf