[EM] IRV vs Plurality ( Kristofer Munsterhjelm )

[Chris Benham]

Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (17 Jan 2010):

"To me, it seems that the method becomes Approval-like when (number of 
graduations) is less than (number of candidates). When that is the case, 
you *have* to rate some candidates equal, unless you opt not to rate 
them at all.

That won't make much of a difference when the number of candidates is 
huge (100 or so), but then, rating 100 candidates would be a pain. I'd 
say it would be better to just have plain yes/no Approval for a "first 
round", then pick the 5-10 most approved for a second round (using 
Range, Condorcet, whatever). Or use minmax approval or PAV or somesuch, 
as long as it homes in on the likely winners of a full vote."

Simply using plain Approval to reduce the field to the top x point scorers
who then compete in the final round seems unsatifactory to me because
of the  "Rich Party" incentive (clone problem) for parties to field x candidates;
and because of the tempting Push-over ("turkey raising") strategy incentive.

Chris Benham


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