[EM] Range strategy pathological example (was Re: IRV vs Plurality)

[Juho]

If Range becomes Approval like then you might add also the weaknesses  
of Approval in your list.

Juho


On Jan 27, 2010, at 7:58 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:

> On Jan 26, 2010, at 9:49 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>> I understand the limitations of my example. I still think it is a  
>> real weakness for Range - actually, the only real weakness. Range  
>> is still one of the best systems out there. But this is a reason to  
>> explore its weaknesses, not to ignore them - especially when these  
>> weaknesses are probably fixable.
>>
>
> Two weaknesses, it seems to me, and I'm less sanguine about their  
> fixability.
>
> One is, as you suggest, the strategy problem. Range, and it's limit  
> in one direction, approval, require the voter to make cast a  
> strategic vote; there really isn't any such thing as a non-strategic  
> range or approval ballot. But voters are privy to different amounts  
> of variably useful information about other voters' preferences, and  
> other voters' strategic choices in view of those (perceived)  
> preferences, and so on ad infinitum.
>
> The second problem kicks in with the suggestion that there *is* a  
> sincere range ballot (not that any voter would cast it), namely some  
> objective measure of utility, comparable from voter to voter. The  
> idea that there's some objective (or at least intersubjective)  
> common measure of cardinal utility is, deservedly, a fringe idea—at  
> best—in social choice theory.
>
> I really don't see out either of these can be fixed.
>
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