[EM] "good method" ? was "IRV ballot pile count (proof of closed form)"

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> On Feb 14, 2010, at 4:46 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> 
>>> We may disagree with the counting method that is applied when
>>>>>> 35:A 32:B>C 33:C
>>> occurs, but it seems very clear that the Condorcet winner in this
>>> case is C, as you seem to agree with me in this case.
>> Yes. The A voters express no preference between B and C. A is the
>> plurality winner. But only 35 voters support A, 65 oppose A by
>> their votes.
> 
> We don't actually know that. Suppose the B>C voters are saying, "I
> love B, hate C, and have no idea who A is". Granted, in this limited
> example, they could easily have voted B>A>C to indicate something
> like that. But if there are a lot of candidates who may be unknown to
> many voters, it's asking a lot for them to list them all (whether or
> not we allow equality of preference).
> 
> I've been thinking of the possibility of handling indifference
> differently. Suppose that '*' means "all candidates not explicitly
> ranked". Then
> 
> A>B is interpreted as usual, implying A>B>*
> 
> But A>*>B mean A is best, B is worst, and all the others are
> indifferent, without having to rank them explicitly between A & B.

Would it be possible to use something like Warren's quorum rule here, so 
that if a voter ranks A>B but not A>B>C, then the B vs C and A vs C 
contest remains completely unaltered?

I suppose so, but would it be any good?