[EM] A Comparison of the Two Known Monotone, Clone Free Methods for Electing Uncovered Alternatives
fsimmons at pcc.edu
fsimmons at pcc.edu
Fri Dec 31 12:44:21 PST 2010
Chris,
You are right that since Chain Climbing does not satisfy IPDA, neither does the method that takes the
parwise victor of it and the Covering Chain winner. I was more thinking out loud than pushing that idea.
Do you think that Approval Sorted Pairwise and the Covering Chain process are simple enough for use in
a public proposal?
Happy New Year!
Forest
----- Original Message -----
From: "C.Benham"
Date: Tuesday, December 28, 2010 7:27 am
Subject: A Comparison of the Two Known Monotone, Clone Free Methods for Electing Uncovered
Alternatives
To: em
Cc: Forest W Simmons
> Forest Simmons wrote (16 Dec 2010):
>
> > Chris,
> >
> > Thanks for reminding me of Approval-Sorted Margins. The
> covering
> > chain method applied to the list obtained
> > by approval sorted margins certainly has a maximal set of nice
> > properties, in that any additional nice
> > property would entail the loss of some highly desireable property.
> >
> > Do you think it is better, in this context, to base approval
> on
> > ranked-above-last, or by use of an explicit
> > approval cutoff marker?
>
>
> Forest,
>
> I like both versions. I think the version that uses an approval
> cut-off (aka threshold) marker is a bit more
> philosophically justified. (It seems arbitrary to assume that
> ranked-above-bottom signifies "approval", or
> putting it the other way, unpleasantly restrictive to not allow
> voters
> to rank among candidates they don't
> approve.)
>
> On the other hand the other version is simpler, and probably
> normally
> elects higher SU winners and resists
> burial strategy a bit better.
>
> From your December 2 post:
>
> > I do suggest the following:
> >
> > In any context where being as faithful as possible to the
> original
> > list order is
> > considered important, perhaps because the only reason for not
> > automatically
> > electing the top of the list is a desire to satisfy Condorcet
> > efficiency, then
> > in this case I suggest computing both the chain climbing
> winner and
> > the covering
> > chain winner for the list L, and then going with which ever of
> the two
> > comes out
> > higher on L.
>
>
> Have you since retreated from this idea? Would using this on
> the list
> obtained from Approval-Sorted Margins lose
> (compared to just using the covering chain method) compliance
> with
> Independence from Pareto-Dominated Alternatives?
>
> Could the two ever give different winners?
>
> Sorry to be a bit tardy in replying,
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
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