[EM] bullet voting and strategy on Approval ballots.

[Dave Ketchum]

Discussing IRV is mostly a waste since, in the Rank Choice world,  
Condorcet is much better.

As to Approval vs Condorcet:
      Approval thoughts can be expressed in Condorcet since Approval  
uses only a single rank and Condorcet extends this to multiple ranks.
      This extra capability costs, so Condorcet can only be justified  
by being worth the extra cost.

Bullet voting is a puzzling topic - it should not be objected to  
except when it fails to meet a voter's obvious needs (e.g., when there  
are two candidates which share odds of winning 90% of the time most  
will see bullet voting as reasonable)..

Anyway:

On Aug 29, 2010, at 12:55 PM, Warren Smith wrote:

> look, what I did not say at any point in this thread so far:
>  * Robert Bristow-Johnson (RBJ) is associated with FairVote.
>  * He thinks IRV is better or worse than approval.
>  * The approval voting ballot is inherently better or worse than a
> rank-order ballot.
>
> What I did say:
>   * evidence from comparing IRV & approval elections indicates
> "bullet voting" is
> NOT more prevalent with approval voting.  If anything it is more
> prevalent with IRV.
>
> RBJ incorrectly stated my evidence was not based on real elections.
>
> That's untrue.
>
> It is based on real IRV and real approval elections, as well as exit
> poll studies (exit poll thus-simulated approval elections), but mostly
> real.  Just read the page:
>    http://rangevoting.org/BulletBugaboo.html
>
> There may be good arguments IRV is better than approval, but this
> bullet-voting business is not one of them.
>
> Further, the fact IRV voters in Burlington -- or any other voters in
> any IRV or approval or any election anywhere else on the planet --
> supposedly cast bullet votes out of "spite" is irrelevant.  (Actually,
> I can think of other reasons besides the ones RBJ listed as the "only"
> ones, why they may have done so, but I simply do not care.) I do not
> give a damn why they did it.  I do not know why they did it.  RBJ may
> think he knows, but he may be right or may be wrong and has no way to
> prove it
> or even define it (what exactly is "spite"? How do you kow for sure
> Jane Voter was "spiteful"?).  Even if RBJ is right, he cannot even
> pretend to know why the IRV and approval voters in all the other
> elections on that page, did what they did.  Maybe they too experienced
> spite or rabies. I do not know.  He does not know.  All I know and
> care about is *DID* they do it, and how much.  I do not know or care
> why.  I am simply gathering the data and reporting the conclusions.
> For whatever reasons -- spite, generosity, whatever fantasies RBJ may
> have, I do not care -- voters appear to bullet vote more often with
> IRV than approval.  Period.  Therefore, criticisms of approval voting
> based on its propensity to attract bullet votes, are misguided (at
> least, unless the same critic also claims IRV is unacceptable exactly
> because of this same reason... which would be a first).
>
> Perhaps this can be attacked, but if so, that attack ought to be based
> on more evidence.  Which I would welcome, but which so far has not
> come my way.
>
> OK?  Let's not overcomplicate matters.
>
> -----------
>
> Now, RBJ has added one more claim: he thinks rank-order ballots make
> voters provide exactly the right amount of info.  In contrast
> (continues RBJ) approval-style ballots are too little info, while
> score-voting style ballots are too much.
> I riposte that I think score voting is the right amount of info. Why?
>
> * A voter may be ignorant about candidate X vs Y, or just about X.
> IRV forces that voter, against her will,  to provide a dishonest
> opinion ("X>Y") or (if its IRV with truncation allowed) forces that
> voter to rank X dishonestly last (which is what truncation does).

Condorcet permits voting "X=Y".
>
> * But with score voting, we can easily allow a voter to leave X  
> unscored
> and thus intentionally express ignorance about X, if she so chooses.
> Also, we can allow voter to score X&Y equal.  IRV does not permit  
> either.
>
> * A voter may have a strong opinion that Hitler and Stalin are both a
> lot worse than
> Gandhi and Jimmy Carter.   IRV forces that voter to pretend all her
> preferences have the same strength and refuses to allow her to express
> an opinion strength.

The other side of this one is that score requires voters to understand  
and do expressions of strength consistent with other voters'  
expressions of such.
>
> Let me put it to you this way.  If H or S win the election. you die.
> If C or G win, you live.  There may also be some comparatively minor
> reasons you prefer, say, S>H and C>G.   IRV refuses to allow you to
> say some of your preferences are life-vs-death and others
> comparatively minor.   Why is this
> the "right amount" of info?
>
> So I don't agree rank-order ballots are "exactly the right amount" of
> info.  They can
> force the voter to provide too much (i.e. necessarily fake) info,  
> while refusing
> to allow the voter to express important honest info.

Agreed there are differences.
>
>
> In addition to that, there are also theoretical indications rank-order
> ballots are a bad idea.  They inherently yield "impossibility
> theorems" and contradictions
> (e.g. "Arrow's theorem") which simply never arise in the score- 
> voting world.
> See
>   http://rangevoting.org/ArrowThm.html

Arrow certainly inspires lots of debate.
>
>   http://rangevoting.org/CondorcetCycles.html

Interesting that one example presented showed value in voters being  
able to express differences via cycles - as opposed to our too  
frequent expression of cycle examples without knowing if they could  
happen in real elections.
>
> These foundational problems strongly suggest that the entire area of
> rank-order ballots, was a mistake, a road that should never have been
> taken.

Why  should we accept this claim while knowing the progression  
of                                 Plurality->Approval->Condorcet  
involves components that are understandable and usable?  Could as  
easily complain about learning to use score productively.
>
> -- 
> Warren D. Smith