[EM] [ESF #1564] True Ranked Choice - for Condorcet

[Dave Ketchum]

On Aug 27, 2010, at 2:41 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> This thread has touched several points.
>
> Branding
>
> I'm not particularly fond of "TRC" as a name for Condorcet. Ideally,  
> a name should give some idea of how the system actually works. That  
> was where my "VOTE" branding idea came from (Virtual One-on-one  
> Tournament Election). Other ideas along those lines:

I just thought of an alternative, but leave this topic open:  Full  
Ranked Choice.

I am still open to thought on this, but the method leans toward  
combining simple rules with power.  Stepping up from starters:
      Plurality - voter ranks ONLY ONE candidate.
      Approval - voter ranks one or more, but all with same rank.
      TRC/FRC - voter ranks one or more, with same or different ranks.
           Each voter is permitted at least one write-in.  Each  
candidate voted by write-in has same right to win as if nominated.   
Can one candidate be voted for partly as nominated and partly via  
write-in?  I lean toward no, but am not decider on this.
           Each pair of candidates is in a race and leader awarded one  
point for ranking if one ranked, or for being ranked higher if both  
ranked by a voter.
           Often one will be ranked the higher of the pair in all of  
that candidate's races.
           If no such, likely there will be a cycle such as A>B>C>A.   
The method used must provide for a winner for this, but TRC/FRC does  
not yet specify what to do.
           Other than such wins or cycles - not considered yet.
      IRV - rejectable for minor restrictions on ballot, and major  
difficulties caused by not reading all that the voter votes.
      Other ranked choice such as Borda or Bucklin,  I claim the above  
win for simplicity and ability, lack of restrictions on ranking when a  
ranking is permitted, count of a ranking varies here for context, etc.
      Other, such as score.
      PR - worth considering for legislatures, etc.  I am arguing for  
such as mayor.
...
>
> Criteria
>
> Bayesian regret is absolutely a fundamentally-important criterion  
> for evaluating voting systems. However, it is not the only  
> criterion. Neither is it entirely objective, since any actual  
> Bayesian regret measure depends on a true-preference model and a  
> strategy model, both of which are inevitably debatable. I don't  
> think it's helpful to try to use some specific set of Bayesian  
> regret measures as a be-all-and-end-all argument. They may be  
> decisive for you, and it's helpful if you say so; but they won't,  
> nor should they, stop other people from taking other positions.
>
> "Let's just pick one system we can all support"
>
We are not ready - but should be discarding the rottenest lemons.
>
>
> JQ

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