[EM] True Ranked Choice - for Condorcet
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-elmet at broadpark.no
Mon Aug 23 14:08:58 PDT 2010
Dave Ketchum wrote:
> I see below that leeswalker is doing his best for IRV.
>
> Would be useful if some of us could do better for Condorcet - which I
> see as a competitor that should win.
>
> TRC - True Ranked Choice - my thought for a possible label for
> Condorcet, based on:
> Like IRV, let's voters rank their choices of candidates.
> UNLIKE IRV, counters READ all that the voters vote.
I've been considering the term "Maximum Majority Voting", which is
another name for the wv version of Ranked Pairs. It is, in a sense,
descriptive, since MMV considers majorities with the maximum first when
building the winner graph.
Come to think of it, leeswalker's "Greatest Majority Voting" might
describe RP/wv better than it does IRV. Unless I'm mistaken, MMV has the
property that "the winner of a strong pairwise contest will be preferred
to the loser of that contest unless the winner was the loser of an even
stronger contest" - it chains majorities together. IRV, on the other
hand, may hide majorities because of the vote-splitting effect of Plurality.
"Greatest Majority Voting" could also be interpreted to mean "elect the
one whose strongest victory is the greatest", but that is not Condorcet.
It's not IRV, either, but my point is that "GMV" seems to be closer to
any of the two above than to IRV. You can get a majority preference by
discarding all but two candidates, and the only thing the final runoff
ensures (without further constraints) is that you won't elect the
Condorcet Loser.
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