[EM] True Ranked Choice - for Condorcet

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-elmet at broadpark.no
Mon Aug 23 14:08:58 PDT 2010


Dave Ketchum wrote:
> I see below that leeswalker is doing his best for IRV.
> 
> Would be useful if some of us could do better for Condorcet - which I 
> see as a competitor that should win.
> 
> TRC - True Ranked Choice  - my thought for a possible label for 
> Condorcet, based on:
>      Like IRV, let's voters rank their choices of candidates.
>      UNLIKE IRV, counters READ all that the voters vote.

I've been considering the term "Maximum Majority Voting", which is 
another name for the wv version of Ranked Pairs. It is, in a sense, 
descriptive, since MMV considers majorities with the maximum first when 
building the winner graph.

Come to think of it, leeswalker's "Greatest Majority Voting" might 
describe RP/wv better than it does IRV. Unless I'm mistaken, MMV has the 
property that "the winner of a strong pairwise contest will be preferred 
to the loser of that contest unless the winner was the loser of an even 
stronger contest" - it chains majorities together. IRV, on the other 
hand, may hide majorities because of the vote-splitting effect of Plurality.

"Greatest Majority Voting" could also be interpreted to mean "elect the 
one whose strongest victory is the greatest", but that is not Condorcet. 
It's not IRV, either, but my point is that "GMV" seems to be closer to 
any of the two above than to IRV. You can get a majority preference by 
discarding all but two candidates, and the only thing the final runoff 
ensures (without further constraints) is that you won't elect the 
Condorcet Loser.



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