[EM] Fwd: [POLMETH] Notice of Paper Posting to Political Methodology

[Kathy Dopp]

They ask for feedback and thank Warren Smith and Forest Simmons of
this list in acknowledgments section. I like that they begin the paper
with a statement noticing the false sales pitches of those supporting
IRV method of counting ballots, and end by noting that approval voting
satisfies the criteria they examine, which they seem to examine in a
logical, understandable fashion (I don't have time to study the paper
in detail now, but it seems very readable):

"Nonetheless, many people defend various
voting reform proposals (e.g. Instant Runo Voting) by claiming that
their proposal will solve the \lesser of two evils" problem, and allow
voters to support their sincere favorite candidate [3, 4]. It is easy to
show that this claim is false for Instant Runo Voting, as there will
still be cases in which voters have an incentive to insincerely rank a
\lesser evil" in rst place. Still, the claims are common, suggesting
that there is public interest in the design of voting methods that elim-
inate the incentive to list a \lesser evil" in rst place."


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:  <polmeth at artsci.wustl.edu>
Date: Tue, Aug 24, 2010 at 8:23 AM
Subject: [POLMETH] Notice of Paper Posting to Political Methodology
To: POLMETH at artsci.wustl.edu


A new document has been added to the Society for Political Methodology Website.

 Title:     Geometric construction of voting methods that protect
voters' first choices

Author(s):     Alex Small

Entry Date:     2010-08-23

Keyword(s):     Geometry, Strategy, Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem,
Election Methods, Ranked Voting

Abstract:      We consider the possibility of designing an election
method that eliminates the incentives for a voter to rank any other
candidate equal to or ahead of his or her sincere favorite.  We refer
to these methods as satisfying the ``Strong Favorite Betrayal
Criterion" (SFBC). Methods satisfying our strategic criteria can be
classified into four categories, according to their geometrical
properties.  We prove that two categories of methods are highly
restricted and closely related to positional methods (point systems)
that give equal points to a voter's first and second choices.  The
third category is tightly restricted, but if criteria are relaxed
slightly a variety of interesting methods can be identified. Finally,
we show that methods in the fourth category are largely irrelevant to
public elections. Interestingly, most of these methods for satisfying
the SFBC do so only ``weakly," in that these methods make no
meaningful distinction between the first and second !

 place on the ballot. However, when we relax our conditions and allow
(but do not require) equal rankings for first place, a wider range of
voting methods are possible, and these methods do indeed make
meaningful distinctions between first and second place.

http://polmeth.wustl.edu/mediaDetail.php?docId=1247

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-- 

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf

View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051