[EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections

[Peter Zbornik]

OK, thanks.
Please go on to propose the condorcet, if you think it is the best.

Approval voting was used in the French presidential election, first round,
where far-right nationalist Le Pen got to the second round.
Le Pen was hardly a centrist.
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting#Effect_on_elections
Quote:"one study [16] showed that approval voting would not have chosen the
same two winners as plurality voting (Chirac and Le Pen) in France's
presidential election of 2002 (first round) - it instead would have chosen
Chirac and Jospin. To some, this seemed a more reasonable result[citation
needed] since Le Pen was a radical who lost to Chirac by an enormous margin
in the second round."

Peter




On 4/28/10, robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Apr 28, 2010, at 2:19 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
>
> Condorcet methods have not been used in politics yet, I think.
>>
>
> Condorcet has not yet been used in a *government* general election.  that
> does not mean it hasn't been used in politics.  it has been used in
> organization elections for a single winner.  i might consider the Czech
> Green Party to be an "organization".  you can choose to use whatever method
> you like without having to get a law passed as you would in a general
> election.
>
> Are there by any chance other methods to elect centrist presidents?
>>
>
> Condorcet *does* tend to favor centrist candidates because Condorcet makes
> good use of 2nd-choice rankings and people on the two extreme wings are
> likely to choose the centrist for their 2nd choice over the extremist on the
> other side.
>
> but that is not a good reason to use Condorcet.  there are many reasons to
> use Condorcet but the main reason is simply majority rule:
>
>    If a majority of voters agree that Candidate A
>    is a better choice than Candidate B, then
>    Candidate B should not be elected.
>
> that's really it.  that's why Condorcet is the correct method over IRV-STV,
> Plurality, Borda, Bucklin, Range, Approval or whatever else they come up
> with.  it's simple, transparent, and directly compatible with the goals of
> majority rule.
>
> despite Kathy Dopp's knee-jerk reaction against STV, it probably remains to
> be the simplest fair method to get proportional representation for the
> multi-winner Council seats.  IRV proponents like to extend STV to
> single-winner, but it's pretty well established that it's inferior to
> Condorcet.  sometimes they elect the same winner and sometimes they don't.
>  the problem is when IRV fails to elect the Condorcet winner - when that
> happens, a majority of voters agreed that Candidate A is a better choice
> than Candidate B, yet Candidate B was elected.
>
> --
>
> r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
>
>
>
>
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