[EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections

[Peter Zbornik]

Hi Jameson,

answers in the text.

On Mon, Apr 26, 2010 at 6:58 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:

> Two questions, before I respond more fully:
>
> 1.
>
> 2010/4/25 Peter Zbornik <pzbornik at gmail.com>
>
> (v) asset voting is excluded due to lack of political support
>>
>
> Can you clarify? Is the problem with vote secrecy of the "lower" delegates,
> and/or with the "back room" process among the "higher" delegates (that is,
> the candidates in the current system)?
>
Yes that is indeed the problem - it allows for bribery and blackmailing.
The secret ballot was introduced together with the equal voting right in
many states of Europe, including the Czech Republic.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_ballot.


>  There are versions of asset voting which avoid either or both problem -
> the former, by only allowing votes for "qualified candidates" (however
> that's defined), and the latter, by having each candidate pre-declare their
> transfer order, which is then made public simultaneously before the vote and
> used to automate the transfer process. In other words, it's basically STV
> with one predeclared ballot type per candidate.
>
The latter system is acceptable to me provided you can chose to cast either
an asset-type vote or a STV vote (in any case you can always vote for
yourself).
The latter system means that the preference orderings should be clearly
stated, which actually could be a good thing to make the voting more
transparent, but I wouldn't call it an essential part of the STV.
Usually the negotiating goes on until shortly before the voting, so I am not
sure if the added value would be so big. Normally the party fractions have
this preference ordering set up anyway.
The former system breaks the principle of the secret ballot.


>
> 2.
> Would you be interested in another proportional system, based on two-rank
> Bucklin ("favor", "approve", or unvoted), which can be explained as STV-like
> - that is, candidates accumulate a pile of a droop quota of (possibly
> fractional) ballots to win, no ballot fraction is in more than one pile or
> in a pile it doesn't approve. The advantages over STV are that my system is
> monotonic, because it can find condorcet-like compromise winners for each
> proportional segment of voters; that it's simpler to vote, either a
> considered individual ballot, a "vote for one candidate, approve one
> faction" simple vote, or a "party-line" factional vote; and that, unlike
> STV, it has a good single-winner special case. The disadvantages are that
> it's completely unknown as a system, that the internal mechanics are
> complicated (except for single winner), and that I don't have a working
> implementation - but I would be willing to code one if you're interested. If
> you are, I would be happy to say more about this.
>
Maybe a description of your system for dummies in three sentences would be a
help, since I don't understand it from your description. Brand-new unproven
systems will have troubles of gaining support, but give it a shot, I am
curious of your system anyway.


>
> Jameson Quinn
>
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