[EM] How to fix the flawed "Nash equilibrium" concept for voting-theory purposes

[Michael Allan]

> > ... There can be no useful relation between a model that assumes a
> > maximum of purposive rationality and a reality that demonstrates
> > none.  No voter ever attempts to improve her standing in the
> > electoral "game", because no single vote ever affects the outcome
> > of a typical election.

Warren Smith wrote:
> ---ok, now you are going too far.  "None"?  Sorry, that is nonsense.

It looks like none.  You offer this, as an example of "some":

> ... humans were designed by Darwin for smaller group sizes,
> e.g. tribes of a few 100 members, and their notions of "rational"
> are designed for groups of those sizes.  I think a lot of behavior
> about sizes larger than that (such as a country-wide election) can
> be understood roughly, by saying "humans do stuff that'd be rational
> if it were size<300.  The human inbuilt pseudo-rationality device
> basically can only count up to 200 and all populations>200 are
> treated by it as 200."

A flaw in reason, then - a delusion.  But delusion is a poor grist for
rational mills, like Nash; not to mention a poor foundation for
democracy.  What would happen if people should ever become un-deluded?

You for instance, Warren.  You are not deluded.  Do you still vote in
local, state or federal elections?  Has your vote ever affected the
outcome?  (I admit that I still vote, though it has no effect.)

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/