[EM] Classifying 3-cand scenarios. LNHarm methods again.

[robert bristow-johnson]

On Apr 18, 2010, at 11:21 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:

> --- En date de : Sam 17.4.10, robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com 
> > a écrit :
>> but cycles don't always happen, and i
>> would bet that they rarely happen in the real world.
>> [Burlington example]
>
> I actually view this as possibly evidence of a possibly correctable
> problem. Or at least "limitation."
>
> It's the same when people say, why worry about scenarios with three
> significant candidates? The real world doesn't have them.

we've known about having 3 or more credible candidates for a long  
time, long enough to know of specific problems when a minority- 
supported candidate wins by plurality, much to the chagrin of the  
majority.

now, it *is* similar to what i was thinking in 2005 as i was voting  
for adopting IRV to the town charter.  i knew it wasn't Condorcet but  
i also understood that if the Condorcet winner makes it to the final  
IRV round, he/she will also win the IRV.  and i expected that it would  
be very unlikely for a candidate to get enough support to be the CW  
and not have enough primary support (1st-pick votes) to get to the  
final round.  so, although i deemed the method clunky, unnatural, and  
not as reflective of the will of the people, i thought it would  
virtually never occur that the Condorcet winner would not be elected.   
boy, was i wrong.

but, i still think it's even more rare that a cycle occurs in reality  
(despite the fact that we can dream up scenarios where it does) and  
what i think is *really* rare is that a meaningful method of resolving  
the cycle would choose different candidates.  if the Smith set is 3  
candidates, we know that Schulze and RP will pick the same winner.

so, politically, i still think the main advocacy should be for  
"Condorcet" (what Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin calls "True Majority  
Rule") and worry about *which* Condorcet method later.  the  
differences between the Condorcet-compliant methods is much smaller  
potatoes than the differences between Condorcet and the non-Condorcet  
methods.

> But the election method, and other facets of the political framework,
> affect who can be nominated, and where, in what quantities etc.

the law doesn't affect it directly.  just because you have the so- 
called "traditional ballot" (plurality and/or delayed runoff) doesn't  
mean you *can't* have 3 or more credible candidates.  but it *can*  
discourage it.  a local poly-sci prof (Tony Gierzynski) who used the  
objective conclusions from Warren's analysis of the anomalies/ 
pathologies of the 2009 Burlington election (all stemming from the  
fact that the IRV winner and CW were not the same) and sorta concludes  
with this:

____________________________________________________________________________

Failing to Address the Real Problem

In essence what IRV is, is an attempt to use a technological fix to  
solve a political problem.  Single seat contests (such as mayor, or US  
Senator, or governor, or president) provide an incentive for those of  
similar political mind (that is ideology) to coalesce behind a single  
candidate in order to win a majority of votes and capture the seat— 
those that work together to build a majority before elections win,  
those that don’t lose. This structural incentive is the main reason  
the US has a two party system. Forcing people of like mind to work  
together to win elections then creates the governing majorities that  
have been approved by the people and that can then go about the work  
of implementing the will of the people.

When a group with a (mostly) shared ideology—such as the case the  
Progressive Party and the Democratic Party in Vermont—becomes  
fragmented in this type of system, with each putting forward their own  
candidates, the problem that arises is a political problem (politics  
defined here simply as the means by which conflicts are resolved in  
order to determine who controls the government).  In such cases, what  
IRV does is it allows the factions to ignore the political problem by  
using a technological fix while failing to resolve their political  
differences through the necessary negotiations that characterize  
politics.  In other words, IRV allows such factions to avoid working  
together (as they should if they want mostly the same thing).  When  
such factions fail to work together, they ultimately fail to  
accomplish the raison d'être of such organizations, which is not just  
to continue existing, but is to win control of government in order to  
use it to make people’s lives better in a manner consistent with their  
political values.

____________________________________________________________________________

now i disagree with Gierzynski's value system here, but i agree with  
him about the consequences.  if the Liberals in Burlington want to  
minimize the likelihood of electing the Conservative candidate for  
mayor, they will now need to seriously consider putting together a  
*single* coalition candidate rather than run a candidate from each of  
the Prog or Dem caucuses.  Gierzynski thinks this is good, i think  
it's bad.


--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."