[EM] How close can we get to the IIAC
Markus Schulze
markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Sat Apr 17 15:12:48 PDT 2010
Hallo,
> Here's a method I proposed a while back that is monotone,
> clone free, always elects a candidate from the uncovered
> set, and is independent from candidates that beat the
> winner, i.e. if a candidate that pairwise beats the
> winner is removed, the winner still wins:
>
> 1. List the candidates in order of decreasing approval.
>
> 2. If the approval winner A is uncovered, then A wins.
>
> 3. Otherwise, let C1 be the first candidate is the list
> that covers A. If C1 is uncovered, then C1 wins.
>
> 4. Else let C2 be the first candidate in the list that
> covers C1. If C2 is uncovered, then C2 wins.
>
> etc.
Situation 1:
Suppose the order of decreasing approval is CDAB.
A beats B
B beats C
C beats D
D beats A
A beats C
B beats D
uncovered set: A, B, D.
The winner is D.
Situation 3:
B beats D. If B is removed, then the uncovered set
is: A, C, D. So, if B is removed, then C wins.
So, the proposed method doesn't satisfy this property:
"If a candidate that pairwise beats the winner is
removed, the winner still wins."
Markus Schulze
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