[EM] Condorcet How? JL

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Thu Apr 15 18:42:54 PDT 2010


Hi Juho,

I don't have much to add except on one point.

--- En date de : Mer 14.4.10, Juho <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
> >> I think I did. For example sincere 49: A>B, 49:
> C>D,
> >> 1: D>B could be one such example. WV elects D,
> and that
> >> could be considered less than perfect performance
> with
> >> sincere votes.
> >> 
> >> (I however think that different elections may
> have
> >> different targets and therefore the best winner
> could be
> >> different in different environments. For example
> the method
> >> might put emphasis on finding a winner that all
> like a lot
> >> on average, that is strong or that is not too much
> disliked
> >> by any.)
> > 
> > I think you have a party list mentality. It seems like
> you want to find
> > a winning faction, here, and pick the winner within
> that faction. You
> > see the D vote and count it to {CD}. But that's an bad
> idea if you're
> > trying to pick the candidate more representative of
> *all* the voters.
> 
> I don't think I wanted them to feel this way. I just
> assumed that in these elections there was a clear division
> between "left" and "right" (sincere in this example)
> (truncation would probably not be as heavy in typical real
> life elections, but this example was just a simplified
> example to show that WV decisions with sincere votes may not
> always be what one would want them to be).

I don't understand how that responds to what I said, or what the first
sentence is referring to. I don't think you understood me. But we come 
back to it below:

> > Ok I see. A3 has no claim over A1 just from the bullet
> vote. So assume
> > it's A3>C2. In that case according to your
> analysis, the A candidates
> > collectively beat B and C,
> 
> Only A3 beats the B and C candidates, not all A candidates,
> no "collective" beating.

I don't believe you: If A3 is the only one who defeated the B and C
factions, how does A1's name even come up?

> > and then "privately" decide almost unanimously
> > that A1 is the candidate who should win, even though
> Team A wouldn't have
> > won without the vote that didn't like A1 at all.
> 
> Yes, that last vote did not support A1 at all, but it was
> the last straw that broke the back of B1 and C1 in margins
> when it made them lose to one of the candidates (A3).

Yes.

> > Yeah I don't like that. I'm trying to pick the most
> median-like candidate,
> > not pick a party and then have an internal election.
> 
> All voters were free to take position on which one of the A
> candidates was best. Many found them equal (or equal enough
> not to bother to rank them). In a real life election B and C
> supporters could well agree with this ranking. There was
> nothing "internal" except the common pattern of voters
> truncating candidates that they do not support.

I can't see any rationale for A1 to win unless this is a team sport.
Otherwise it seems backwards. A3 beats six candidates all by himself,
but the win is given instead to somebody who didn't beat any of them,
he just beat the guy who did.

It reminds me of this in fact:

35 A>B
25 B
40 C

B defeats C, but A says "well hold on, you're on my team (if you didn't
know), so actually *I* won."

That's the team explanation, I can follow that. If you don't follow that
explanation then what the heck? Who is this A guy that thinks he won?

As far as B and C voters actually agreeing with Team A's internal
ranking: Maybe but in a political election there's plenty of room for
doubt. What are the odds that the Republicans' favorite Republican is
also the Democrats' favorite Republican? From an issue space perspective
that's not very likely.

Kevin Venzke


      



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