[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 70, Issue 20

[Dave Ketchum]

> Hello,
>
> Warren Smith wrote:
>> For example, consider a 2-way election Gandhi vs Hitler in which  
>> everybody votes
>> for the (unanimously agreed to be) worst choice: Hitler.
>>
>> Well, that is a "Nash equilibrium" because no single voter can change
>> the election result!
>>
>> Indeed, essentially every possible vote pattern in every possible
>> large election, is a Nash equilibrium.
>
Disagreed.

True that Nash applies to the last voter if not at a tie.  However, if  
at a tie, this voter has full control of the result.  As we step  
backward thru election activity we decrease the probability of Nash  
applying as a reason for voting for Hitler - in fact it becomes more  
reason for voting for Gandhi.

Dave Ketchum