[EM] How to fix the flawed "Nash equilibrium" concept for voting-theory purposes

[Peter de Blanc]

I wonder what your goal is in reducing the number of Nash equilibria in 
an election. If you're trying to use the modified election method as a 
model for studying the old method, then you might also look at some 
alternative types of equilibria which are more restrictive than the Nash 
equilibrium. The "trembling hand" equilibrium randomizes player actions, 
but it uses infinitesimal probabilities. I've done some analysis of 
elections using a new type of equilibrium called a Cabal equilibrium, 
but it didn't get much attention when I posted it here. (If you want to 
read about it: http://www.spaceandgames.com/?p=106 
http://www.spaceandgames.com/?p=134 )

My other guess is that your goal is to increase voter turnout by 
increasing a voter's probability of changing the election outcome. 
However, I think changing this probability from 0 to 10^-10,000 is 
inconsequential.

  - Peter de Blanc