[EM] How to fix the flawed "Nash equilibrium" concept for voting-theory purposes

[Raph Frank]

On Wed, Apr 14, 2010 at 11:06 AM, Michael Allan <mike at zelea.com> wrote:
> It's also an indication of the problem.  Consider these two facts:
>
>  1. Current voting methods lack the Nash-redeeming addition.  In a
>    typical election, no individual vote has any effect on the result.
>    The effect is exactly zero.
>
>  2. Voters nevertheless turn out in large numbers.
>
> It follows that the individual voter is *not* attempting to affect the
> results.  If we grant him/her a degree of competence and foresight, we
> must conclude that voting is not a purposive-rational situation, and
> we have little to gain from applying Nash's purposive-rational theory
> to it.  Warren was right in the first place: "Nash says almost nothing
> about voting.  It is worthless."  (But that's the end of it.)

Another way of phrasing it would be that people see value in
increasing their side's total number of votes.

Thus, each vote does in fact count.

Also, each person's vote might make a difference.