[EM] How to fix the flawed "Nash equilibrium" concept for voting-theory purposes

[Michael Allan]

Warren Smith wrote:
> Well, that is a "Nash equilibrium" because no single voter can
> change the election result! ...  Nash says almost nothing about
> voting.  It is worthless. ...  But now here is a very simple and
> highly effective fix ... Have each voter cast, not "one vote" but
> rather each voter casts "a standard gaussian random variable" number
> of votes of each possible type ...

Or could we use a method based on recursive delegation?  Then at least
one voter could always alter the result by shifting his vote - namely
the winner.  The winner would be Ghandi, of course, and being Ghandi,
he would shift his vote to someone else. ;-)

(I agree with Abd.  Nash equilibria may be less meaningful in
 situations where people can speak with each other, reach
 understandings and coordinate their actions.  Voting methods might
 better take *that* capability as their touchstone.)
-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/