[EM] Condorcet How?

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 05:57 AM 4/8/2010, Raph Frank wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum 
>> <davek at clarityconnect.com> wrote:
>> > Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
>> > counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if assumption 
>> correct
>> > the count verifies it; if incorrect, must recount).
>>
>> How do you handle write-ins.  Are write-ins assumed to be equal last
>> on all ballots which don't mention them?
> 
> Yes. Average Range will treat them as abstentions from rating, but as 
> votes, they are problematic. Only Asset Voting can truly fix this 
> problem. However, there is another solution: require a majority. In that 
> case, with good runoff rules, a write-in could get into a runoff 
> election by causing majority failure, at some threshold or standard, one 
> designed to catch write-ins that might win, given a chance. My proposal 
> is to implement Bucklin as a runoff voting system and thus start to 
> collect data that could then be used to determine future reforms. If the 
> runoff allows write-ins, and the first election results show promise, a 
> write-in candidacy at that point would be one where other voters were 
> informed. Write-ins in a Bucklin runoff with, say, no more than three 
> candidates, and a serious poll preceding it as the primary, is very 
> interesting.

I'll note here that Bucklin is not cloneproof, and in some cases it can 
reward cloning. See 
http://www.mail-archive.com/election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com/msg02705.html 
. Thus it might pay for voters of some opinion to add lots of write-ins 
of the same opinion (leftist, right-winger) as clones.

Your limit to the number of write-ins would help fix that issue, but it 
does exist.