[EM] Condorcet How?

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Thu Apr 8 14:59:14 PDT 2010


Being the "you" that Raph was addressing, I offer what I was proposing.

As the subject indicates, the topic is Condorcet voting.  Also,  
listing a candidate who is on the ballot, and could be voted for as  
such, should be counted as a misdeed - such could be voted for in the  
normal manner without complicating life for those trying to count votes.

But write-ins for those who could fill the office being voted for  
should identify such persons as valid candidates.  These normally do  
not get enough votes to earn other than counting to verify they are  
too few to deserve more.  In the rare case of more votes they should  
be treated as if actually nominated.

As to "equal last", not being mentioned should be treated the same as  
a not mentioned nominated candidate.

Dave Ketchum

On Apr 8, 2010, at 1:44 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 05:57 AM 4/8/2010, Raph Frank wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 7, 2010 at 11:25 PM, Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com 
>> > wrote:
>> > Write-ins permitted (if few write-ins expected,
>> > counters may lump all such as if a single candidate - if  
>> assumption correct
>> > the count verifies it; if incorrect, must recount).
>>
>> How do you handle write-ins.  Are write-ins assumed to be equal last
>> on all ballots which don't mention them?
>
> Yes. Average Range will treat them as abstentions from rating, but  
> as votes, they are problematic. Only Asset Voting can truly fix this  
> problem. However, there is another solution: require a majority. In  
> that case, with good runoff rules, a write-in could get into a  
> runoff election by causing majority failure, at some threshold or  
> standard, one designed to catch write-ins that might win, given a  
> chance. My proposal is to implement Bucklin as a runoff voting  
> system and thus start to collect data that could then be used to  
> determine future reforms. If the runoff allows write-ins, and the  
> first election results show promise, a write-in candidacy at that  
> point would be one where other voters were informed. Write-ins in a  
> Bucklin runoff with, say, no more than three candidates, and a  
> serious poll preceding it as the primary, is very interesting.
>
> And then, if this is put on the table, we will clearly run into the  
> fact that established power almost certainly doesn't want write-ins  
> to be viable, nor does it want third parties to have a chance.  
> Instant runoff voting, almost certainly, confines winning to two  
> major parties except in multiwinner elections (where it really isn't  
> "instant runoff," it's different.)
>
> In real runoff elections, write-ins sometimes win, even without a  
> write-in runoff. All they have to do is make it up to second place.  
> In fact, famous pathological elections are based on this, because  
> the Condorcet winner got bumped down to third place. Lizard vs.  
> Wizard. If the Wizard had been a write-in candidate, this would have  
> been an example, but, since it was close between Duke (the Wizard)  
> and Roemer, Duke wouldn't have made it into the runoff, but it would  
> have been Roemer vs. the Lizard, and Roemer would have won, certainly.
>
> Bucklin would easily fix elections like this; and good runoff rules  
> would detect a viable third candidate and include him or her. If  
> it's top-two, then, for sure, write-ins should be allowed. With a  
> Bucklin runoff, the voters who prefer a write-in (and they would  
> have been in the majority, I believe, in Lizard v. Wizard) would  
> have written in Roemer. And would have put in bottom approved rank,  
> the Lizard. Duke would have ended up in third place in the end, even  
> if he didn't get dropped in a Bucklin primary.
>






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