[EM] DYN

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

Kevin Venzke quoted me ...

--- En date de : Dim 4.4.10, fsimmons at pcc.edu <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a écrit :
I waould like to advertise Delegable Yes No (DYN) voting again.  It overcomes the main difficulty with 
Approval, which is that the common voter will will not feel sure about approving or disapproving some of 
the candidates.  
Under DYN you check Y next to all of the candidates that you are sure that you want to approve (like 
your favorite), you check N next to all of the candidates that you are sure that you disapprove (like the 
candidate you most detest), you leave blank the choices for the candidates you are not sure about, and 
you circle the name of the approved candidate that you want to delegate the remaining Y/N decisions to.
After the sure Y/N votes are counted, the candidates make their proxy votes for their supporters on the 
delegated choices.  The partial talleys already available to them help to counteract disinformation from 
the media.
This is one way to solve the problem
49 C
26 A>B
25 B>A
Where the 25 threaten to bullet B.

--end quote

.. and then wrote ...

I'm not sure that scenario is one that would be repaired. To me that 
isn't about poor information, it's a game of chicken inherent to a
lot of methods. You're just changing who gets to play.

I guess an example would be more like this:
51 A>B
5 B
44 C

If the 51 voters don't approve B then A can decline to add approval to
B at no risk at all.

I had a method some years ago called "withdrawable approval" I think,
which simulates something like this...


I reply: 

Kevin yours is a better example of the  helpful information aspect.  But, suppose the candidates could 
enter into binding contracts with each other about how to "spend" their proxy assets.  Then (in my 
scenario) A could say, "I approve B only if B approves me," or "I give the exact amout of approval to B 
that B does to me."  With that contract in place, B's rational play is to give A complete approval.

In general, it seems to me that DYN is as likely to pick the CW (when there is one) as any Condorcet 
method.  In particular, I don't see DYN having the burial problem that most Condorcet methods have with 
the sincere profile

45 A>C>B  (burial strategy vote would be A>B>C)
30 B>C>A
25 C>A>B

Under DYN,  A 's decision about C isn't going to make any difference, because B is going to approve C 
to keep A from winning.

Forest