[EM] Mean Weighted Political Distance
Dan Bishop
danbishop04 at gmail.com
Tue Mar 31 21:53:54 PDT 2009
A while back, I proposed a measure called "mean minimum political
distance" (MMPD) for evaluating multi-winner election methods. It works
pretty well on the uniform linear political spectrum, but rather poorly
for a polarized electorate.
Surely, a voter's evaluation of the election result would consider ALL
of the winners, not just the one nearest their views. And we can do
this with a straightforward extension of MPD.
Define the "weighted political distance" (WPD) between a voter V and the
winning candidate set S as the dot product of D and W, where D =
sorted(distance(V, C) for C in S), and W is an array of weights. The
"mean weighted political distance" (MWPD) is the mean of the WPD over
all voters.
I choose W based on the polarized two-party model, i.e., p of the voters
at position 0.0 of the linear spectrum, and 1-p at position 1.0, giving
the ballots
p: A1=A2=A3=A4=... > B1=B2=B3=B4=...
1-p: B1=B2=B3=B4=... > B1=B2=B3=B4=...
If "a" denotes the number of winning A candidates, and "b" denotes the
number of winning B candidates, then
MWPD = p*sum(W[a:]) + (1-p)*sum(W[b:])
In a 2-winner election with W= [1, x], the possibilities are:
a=0, b=2 --> MWPD = p*(1+x)
a=1, b=1 --> MWPD = p*x + (1-p)*x = x
a=2, b=0 --> MWPD = (1-p)*(1+x)
If we want MWPD minimization to be Droop-proportional, then x=1/2.
In a 3-winner election with W = [1, 1/2, x],
a=0, b=3 --> MWPD = p*(3/2+x)
a=1, b=2 --> MWPD = p*(1/2+x) + (1-p)*x
a=2, b=1 --> MWPD = p*x + (1-p)*(1/2+x)
a=3, b=0 --> MWPD = (1-p)*(3/2+x)
Using the same Droop-proportionality criterion, we get x=1/3.
In a 4-winner election with W = [1, 1/2, 1/3, x],
a=0, b=4 --> MWPD = p*(11/6+x)
a=1, b=3 --> MWPD = p*(5/6+x) + (1-p)*x
a=2, b=2 --> MWPD = p*(1/3+x) + (1-p)*(1/3+x) = 1/3+x
a=3, b=1 --> MWPD = p*x + (1-p)*(5/6+x)
a=4, b=0 --> MWPD = (1-p)*(11/6+x)
For which x=1/4. By now, the pattern is clear: W=[1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4,
..., 1/N].
Now, consider the uniform linear political spectrum. Where do the
election winners need to be to minimize MWPD? Based on my simulations
so far (brute force with candidates i/60 and voters (i+0.5)/100):
S={0.5} --> MWPD=0.25
S={0.36666666666666664, 0.6166666666666667} --> MWPD=0.34383333333333338
S={0.31666666666666665, 0.5, 0.68333333333333335} -->
MWPD=0.3949111111111111
I was expecting it to be the Droop multiples. Looks like it's a little
more centrist-biased than that, but not intolerably so.
Note that in the single-winner case, MWPD minimization elects the
Condorcet winner (although this would not necessarily be true for
asymmetric spectrums).
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list