[EM] Forced strictly-dishonest strategy is common in Schulze-beatpaths voting

[Warren Smith]

I don't follow most of what you (Michael Poole) said.
However, re your final paragraph

>So accepting, arguendo, that 75% of voters might -- a posteriori --
>gain expected utility from strategic order reversal, to conclude how
>they would feel about that requires an argument that they care more
>about the vanishingly small gain in utility than they do about honesty
>in voting.

the answer is "exactly."

I have news for you.   The concept of "strategic voting" is entirely
about caring more about  vanishingly small gains in utility than about
honesty.

Now, if you wish to claim that strategic voting is unimportant or does
not exist, then fine:
There is no need for you to worry about this.

However, oddly enough, poll evidence indicated that, e.g. 90% of
honest-Nader-top
voters voted for somebody else in 2000.   The chance that any
particular such voter
would, by her vote alone, alter the election result, was microscopic.
(And indeed,
as usual, it did not happen.   No individual vote has ever had the
power to affect
any statewide election in US history so far.)  As indeed, is
essentially always true in any large election.

As a result of such problems, many people formed the electorama list,
trying to think of other voting methods that overcome this and related
flaws in plurality voting.
I'm surprised to hear you consider all that effort to be a waste of time because
people are honest and would never be strategic.



-- 
Warren D. Smith
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