[EM] Strategic voting in Condorcet & Range N-canddt elections

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Warren,

--- En date de : Mar 9.6.09, Warren Smith <warren.wds at gmail.com> a écrit :
> 2. In the unlikely event your vote CAN have an effect, it
> is most
> likely to be because you have a chance to create or break a
> tie
> between TWO candidates -- call them A & B -- the two
> "frontrunners."
> More precisely, you have an opportunity to make either
> win.
> Wlog we shall assume you prefer A over B.
> 
> 3. Much less likely still is the situation where your vote
> actually
> has the power to make one of THREE or more candidates win
> (you choose
> which).  Let us NEGLECT that as just too incredibly
> unlikely.

There is another scenario of interest to me, where you can only break a 
tie between two candidates, but it isn't certain which two candidates they
will be, at the time you're voting.

If we'll always be limited to two frontrunners, then I'm not all that
interested in reform.

> 5. In a monotone Condorcet method (such as Schulze, Tideman
> ranked
> pairs, etc) you cannot go wrong by ranking A top and B
> bottom (both of
> which, in general, will be dishonest, but this is always
> strategically
> correct).

What assumptions are you making? This doesn't seem to be demonstrated.

Kevin Venzke