[EM] information content, game theory, cooperation

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Sun Jun 7 01:44:21 PDT 2009


Hi,

--- En date de : Dim 7.6.09, Árpád Magosányi <magwas at rabic.org> a écrit :
> Shulze prefers the candidate which beatpath is weak (as far
> I can remember Schulze's description). Which means
> something like it is the least unacceptable candidate. I
> have the feeling that this is connected with cooperativeness
> of the candidate.
> 
> Formal description or refusal of this effect is welcome.

Schulze is a Condorcet method, so that it wants to elect the candidate who could defeat any other candidate head-to-head.

When such a candidate doesn't exist, then Schulze wants to find the candidate whose worst loss is the least. (The idea is to reduce the number of voters who have good reason to object to the outcome.)

But simply doing this would violate clone independence. So beatpaths are used to ensure that a candidate doesn't lose simply due to being a clone.

That's not very formal but it's how I would explain it.

Kevin Venzke


      



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