[EM] Schulze definition (was: information content, game theory, cooperation)

[Juho Laatu]

I'm actually ok also with non-Smith-compatible
methods. They may have their own benefits even
if they might violate clone independence in
some unlikely situations. In typical large
public elections all typical Condorcet methods
are in any case likely to give similar results.
My thinking was that if the question on the
referendum excludes IRV, then the final outcome
is anyway likely to be Schulze (and the
unlikely event of choosing some other one of
the good Condorcet methods would not be a big
problem).

Juho

--- On Mon, 8/6/09, Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Jun 7, 2009 at 10:20 PM, Juho
> Laatu<juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk>
> wrote:
> > It could be thus enough to say:
> > - The electors rank the candidates
> >  according to their preferences.
> > - If some candidate is preferred over
> >  all other candidates then that
> >  candidate shall be elected.
> 
> I think that Smith compliance should be required. 
> Condorcet
> compliance on its own isn't that great.
> 
> Frankly, even if 1 condorcet method is better than others,
> going from
> plurality to any Condorcet/Smith method is a massive
> improvement.
> Also, the benefit to the politicians is pretty small from
> picking a
> horrible condorcet method, so hopefully they won't bother
> (though
> maybe that is overly trusting).
> 
> If an added criteria is needed, then maybe add clone
> independence.
> However, then you are adding more complexity.
> 
> "Do you want the voting method to be one where
> 
> The voters rank the candidates, and,
> unranked candidates are considered equal worst, and,
> a candidate is considered preferred to another if he is
> preferred by a
> majority of the voters who express a preference, and,
> If a candidate is ranked first on a majority of the
> ballots, then that
> candidate wins, and,
> if a candidate is preferred to all other candidates, then
> that
> candidate wins, and,
> If every candidate in a group of candidates is preferred to
> all
> candidates outside the group, then one of them wins
> ?
> "
> 
> This has some redundant clauses, but adding them actually
> makes it
> clearer (I think).   In, theory you only
> need the last one as the
> other 2 rules automatically follow.
> 
> Maybe you could submit one that only requires condorcet
> compliance as
> the 3 clause is complex.
> 
> Btw, does Schulze allow equal rankings?
>