[EM] Redistricting, now with racial demographics

[Aaron Armitage]

--- On Mon, 7/20/09, Raph Frank <raphfrk at gmail.com> wrote:

> > I would think that presetting the desired boundaries
> would avoid that.
> 
> Pre-set boundaries have the disadvantage that the lead to
> imbalances
> in the voter to seat ratios.
> 
> A 5 seat district could have a population of anywhere
> between 4.5 and
> 5.5 of the national average (roughly).  This gives a
> potential
> imbalance of +/- 10%.
> 

I didn't mean presetting the entire shape of any district, just the line
along whatever geographic or cultural divide we think districts shouldn't
cross. The program will draw the other lines to equalize population and
maximize whichever value (compactness, distance from the geographical
center, travel time, etc.) we make our standard for good districts.

> Ofc, if the districts are very large, then this is less of
> an issue.
> Also, the elimination of gerrymandering might be worth the
> slight
> imbalance.
> 
> The imbalance is worst when the districts are small. 
> One option is to
> have a process for combining smaller districts.
> 
> For example, any district which has less than 5 seats is
> combined with
> a neighbour.  Once that is done, any district with
> more than 12 seats
> is split in 2 so that each part has at least 5 seats.
> 
> Ofc, that would like not be acceptable in the US, assuming
> by
> district, you mean State.
> 

I mean geographical divisions that exist solely to designate which voters
will fill a seat or set of seats. A state may also serve that function,
but that's not the reason it exists. Your intuition is right: merging and
splitting states to create a desired magnitude (in the House elections,
presumably) wouldn't be acceptable to the general public, because that's
not what states are for. Actually, I don't really see much to be gained
from it even in situations where the designer has a free hand to set
district lines. It seems better to me to equalize the magnitudes and
adjust the lines (or draw them de novo after every census) to keep them
equal. In the context of House elections in America that's complicated by
the fact that each state is apportioned a number of Representatives based
on population, but within each state the districts could be of the same
magnitude, with any remainder elected at-large. (Although at the current
size of the House most states won't even need districts to use standard
STV.)

> > [if both used PR-STV] I see no reason for having two
> houses, in that case.
> 
> It probably depends on how you do it.
> 
> In the US, you could in principle elect the 2 Senators
> using PR-STV
> and the N Representatives using PR-STV.
> 
> This would mean that there is still an imbalance between
> the 2 Houses,
> due to the population imbalance between the States.
> 
> Another option is longer terms.
> 
> For example, you could expand the terms for the
> Senate.  If you
> elected 5 Senators by PR-STV, every 2 years, for a 20 year
> term, then
> that would give you a 50 member Senate.
> 
> The House could also be elected by PR-STV, but as a single
> block.
> 
> The effect would be that the Senate is more stable (as it
> is the
> average viewpoint over a 20 year period), while the House
> would be a
> snap-shot.  Also, at any time at most 10% of the
> Senate would be
> seeking re-election, so it would be less subject to short
> terrm
> election planning.  Ofc, with 20 year terms, many
> Senators would
> probably just seek 1 term.
> 
> This may lead to the Senate being considered "old and wise"
> or maybe
> just massively corrupt due to the lack of having to stand
> for
> re-election.
> 
> In Ireland, the Seanad doesn't have veto powers over
> legislation.  It
> only has the ability to delay legislation for 180
> days.  It isn't
> actually very powerful anyway, as the Government has the
> right to
> appoint 11 members (out of 60), so they always have a
> majority in the
> Seanad (though at the moment, their majority is zero, so
> they rely on
> the Chairman's casting vote).
> 
> I would also add a rule that Senators and Representatives
> can't become
> members of the other House for at least 5 years after they
> have left
> their original house.  This is to try to encourage
> different types of
> people to stand for each House.
>

That's an interesting idea, although I doubt many American voters would
be willing to accept such long terms. Perhaps something like that,
combined with a power to veto legislation or at least call early
elections for Commons, would be a suitable reform (or replacement) for
the the House of Lords in the UK.