[EM] National Popular Vote & Condorcet

[Dave Ketchum]

I have two basic assumptions:
      States are willing to have a reasonable national count.
      But some may not be willing to all go where I wish them to be -  
letting their voters vote in Condorcet.

Still, some methods such as Range do not provide suitable information  
for this purpose - my real goal for these is to have them use a  
different, more compatible, method.

For example, a state could use Plurality for this race, whatever they  
may choose to use in other races.

On Jul 2, 2009, at 7:51 PM, Raph Frank wrote:

> On Thu, Jul 2, 2009 at 10:03 PM, Dave  
> Ketchum<davek at clarityconnect.com> wrote:
>> Each state controls how it interacts with its voters - so let them  
>> choose
>> their own way, such that their voters' desires get properly added  
>> into the
>> national X*X array.
>
> This depends, there needs to be rules on what states can do.
>
> For example, they could create  the array so that it is
>
> State winner>(others)
>
> for all voters in the state.

I assume more cooperation than this.
>
>
> In effect, this returns things to the current, pre-NPV, system.
>
>>> Plurality:
>>> A vote for candidate A is considered
>>> A>(others)
>>
>> This reads as giving the same power as if ranking ONE candidate in  
>> Condorcet
>> - simple and declarably accurate.
>
> It also means that only the expected national top-2 can get votes from
> this state.

No, for EACH candidate gets treated as A in its turn.
>
>
> Ofc, this isn't as extreme as currently, and if other states support
> more open methods, at least candidates can gain publicity in one
> election for a challenge on the next.
>
>>> Condorcet:
>>> Matrix is provided directly
>>>
>>> IRV:
>>
>> Here the voters could have ranked exactly as in Condorcet, but  
>> standard IRV
>> counting does not extract all that the voters say.  I would leave  
>> it to the
>> state - perhaps they will do an X*X matrix.  I do not like what I  
>> read below
>> - better for such states to avoid such as IRV when  they do not fit  
>> with
>> what is reasonably the standard.
>
> Right, if they collect ranked ballots, it would be best if they
> publish the full results.

Since their voters are doing ranking, just as in Condorcet, they have  
all the information to do an X*X array - but I avoid demanding that  
they do such.
>
>
> However you need to somehow handle the case where states use IRV.
>
> For example, the State might have a rule that all EC votes for the
> State are assigned to the IRV winner in the state, so they don't
> publish ballot info.

The goal here is maximum practical cooperation - which includes their  
EC votes getting based on the NPV winner - what I am trying for is  
maximum validity for the NPV.
>
>>> Approval/Range
>>
>> For approval my first thought is that they are presumably doing  
>> approval and
>> my first choice for them is whatever Condorcet states do when their  
>> voters
>> vote with approval thinking.
>
> Again, the States may not publish the date required.
>
> I would agree that a voter who approved candidate A and B should
> ideally be considered
>
> A=B>(others).
>
> However, you can't extract that info from the approval results.
>
>> For Range the thinking is much as I do above for IRV.
>
> Again, if the full ballot info is released, it would be worth
> converting the range votes into condorcet, but there is a need to
> handle things if the State doesn't provide the info.

I think it best for the state to do the conversion, assuming they  
insist on using a method for this race that requires painful  
conversion - and, at that point, I prefer that that state have the  
pain of converting.
>
> It occurs to me that you could just include rules for comparisons
> rather than trying to work out the votes for approval.
>
> Approval
>
> A: 800
> B: 400
> C: 300
> Total 1500
>
> Comparing A and B
> 800-400
>
> This means that the votes are assumed to be
> 200: A=B
> 600: A>B
> 200: B
>
> A>B: 600-200
>
> Comparing B and C
> 400-300
>
> B>C: 400-300
>
> Comparing A and C
> 100: A=C
> 700: A
> 200: C
>
> A>C: 700-200
>
> Thus the rule when determining the pairwise comparisons is to assume
> that the number of equality votes are minimum.
>
> This may not even effect the result depending on completion method  
> used.
>
> For example:
>
> A: 800
> C: 300
>
> must be
> A=C: X
> A: 800-X
> B: 300-X
>
> Thus the win margin is (800-X) - (300-X) = 500.  As long as the win
> margin is all that matters we can determine the exact national result
> without knowing exactly the number of ballots where there is a tie.

What follows puzzles.  Thinking:
      Approval can easily be restated in Condorcet.
      Condorcet is my intended goal, so the state has info for an X*X  
array.
      Plurality I say to treat as if each of those votes was Condorcet  
ranking a single candidate.
      For IRV the ballots contained ranking but I leave open whether  
the state chooses to see all that the ballots say.
>
>
> Thus, approval, condorcet (if matrix is provided) and plurality
> results can be converted to an exact matrix (or equivalent).
>
> IRV cannot be fully supported, and ballot info is lost.