[EM] Time of trouble - Premise 2

[Juho Laatu]

--- On Mon, 16/2/09, Michael Allan <mike at zelea.com> wrote:

> > I read "A -> B" as "if A is widespread
> > then also B is or will be widespread".
> > This could cover also cases "B is
> > likely to be widespread"...
> 
> Yes, it's a causal operator.  So the relation "A
> -> B" means "if A
> then B".  (It ought to be quantified with a
> probability, but we have
> no numbers.)
> 
> > ... and "B can be widespread".
> 
> As in "if B then A"?  Or "if B then probably
> A"?

I was thinking about causal relationships
like "if with_probability_x A then
with_probability_x B" or
"...at_least_close_to_probability_x B".


> If the IT allows, then an individual voter might opt to
> express secret
> OR(f) instead of public OP(f).  I believe the IT will allow
> this - I
> believe it ought to, as you and Kristopher convinced me
> earlier - as a
> kind of safety valve.  It does not appear in our model,
> yet.
> 
> But the crucial thing for this particular class of IT is
> OP(f).  There
> must be plenty of it.  Otherwise the technical/useability
> challenges
> of IT(a,c,p,r,s) may be too great.  (Of course, we allow
> other classes
> of IT, and other paths to DD.)

In many cases it is sufficient if
regular people at the bottom of the
delegation hierarchy are allowed to
cast a secret ballot.


> > > Any consensus that attracts a quorum of voters
> (however defined),
> > > and that holds stable, is PD by definition.
> > > 
> > >   (a.4)  OP(f) + IT(c)  ->  OP(f,consensus)  =
>  PD
> > 
> > You didn't include the quorum
> > requirement in the equation. One could
> > add additional requirements like
> > IT(u,t), IT that is used and trusted
> > widely, to derive PD.
> 
> But (u,t) are non-technical, and cannot be part of IT per
> se.

Yes, they are not technical. But they
refer to some particular IT service
that is widely used and trusted - i.e.
one that has sufficient basis to claim
that a consensus has been reached.

> 
> They
> would have to be separate terms.  Something like this:
> 
>   used widely  =  OP(f,quorum)
> 
>   trust  ->  OP(f,quorum)

There may be several IT systems and
trust in one of them may not yet
mean quorum at society level.
Having several IT candidates may be
a sufficient reason in general not
to achieve quorum in any of them.
You could either make the numerous
alternative IT systems visible or
assume that there will be one
dominant IT system.


> Tacking to another approach: A quorum of OR(f) is a fact in
> RD.  This
> is our reference.  So primary turnout for OP(f) must
> approach the
> level of general elections.  Here are some strong
> mechanisms:
> 
>    i) Precedent: the fact of a quorum for the sake of RD
> sets an
>       example, and people will know they're expected to
> follow it, for
>       the sake of DD.
> 
>   ii) Herding: feedback loop of a.3.
> 
>  iii) Corraling: argument of natural monopoly for IT,
> hinging on
>       probability that all splits of the electorate are
> unstable, so
>       there'll be a single system. (see further below)
> 
>   iv) Novelty: people can't ordinarilly vote on norms,
> so it's not
>       unreasonable to expect an especially high turnout in
> OP(f) for
>       norms - primary candidate bills for the RD assembly,
> etc. - in
>       anticipation of eventual A(n).
> 
>    v) Synergy: investment of time in (iv) generates the
> competence to
>       also vote OP(f) for offices - primary candidate
> members for the
>       RD assembly, etc. - and the incentive to so.  People
> will know
>       (from b.3) that A(n) depends on A(o).
> 
> Are these mechanisms improbable?  Are there any strong
> reverse
> mechanisms, or blocks, that would be likely to prevent a
> quorum?

- Having too many too uninteresting
  elections

- Having several competing IT systems

- The opposite of novelty, getting
  bored with the system

- Involvement of party and other
  plotting

- Fights between individuals (e.g. on
  whose proposal will be voted on)

- Unclarity and fights on the results
  achieved with th IT systems

- Low quality of proposals and
  discussions

- Fears related to presenting one's
  opinion in a public vote

- Complexity of the system

- Lack of time (maybe people use their
  time and IT technology for other uses
  like playing games and voting in
  reality TV programs)

- Lack of expertise (in many areas the
  regular people are not experts and do
  not want to start studying the topic
  / proposed norm)


> > > On the one hand, the IT may be configured to
> support primary
> > > elections, and thus to to nominate cross-party
> candidates for
> > > office:
> > 
> > I guess these nominations could be
> > unofficial.
> 
> In the sense of non-party?  They might have to be:
> 
> (I). Organized parties cannot endorse PD(o), if they wish
> to survive.
> Although a party might announce that the IT is henceforth
> its official
> primary, and thus PD(o) its official endorsement, there
> would be
> nothing to prevent another party from doing the same.  In
> that event,
> there would be no distinguishing the two.  It follows that
> a party
> must oppose PD(o) in principle, or cease to exist.  (Is
> this true?)

I was thinking of informal opinion
polls whose results may or may not
be followed later. The results of
party level or society level
primaries would thus not be binding
but there could be other candidates
too than "primary winners".

Parties may still support the IT
system and PD(o) and just work to
promote their own candidates within
that system (i.e. they need not
cease to exist).


> >                         ... One can
> > interpret "->" also so that there is a
> > tendency to go in this direction but
> > not that the end result would be
> > guaranteed or probable. All the
> > conditions and equations were maybe not
> > 100% strict, and many smaller conditions
> > may also be missing.
> 
> "Probable" is intended.  You may counter by
> saying "improbable".  We
> then compare reasons.  The overall argument is probable DD.

The chain of arrows is long, each
step may not be 100% solid logical
consequence, and corruption may
sneak in at all the steps.
Therefore also the end result (DD)
may be just approximate or just a
tendency (that the available IT
technology supports but does not
guarantee and does not make
perfect).


So, I agree that IT (in general)
has some tendency to make the
society more DD like. It is also
possible that people get
disappointed after trying to push
the society in that direction for
a while. But that doesn't mean
that the potential would not
exist.


> Therefore a ratchet effect will eventually clear the
> assembly of all
> party endorsed members.  (Is this true?)

Not quite. The old system (RD) and
party nominations there may lose
some importance but parties may
still endorse some candidates (in
the IT process) and make their
supporters vote for those
candidates. Maybe they'll arrange
a party primary before the IT
primary.


> More importantly, the formal argument makes it easier to
> separate the
> practical questions (how does it work?) from the moral (is
> it good?).
> Those two tend to get confused.

Yes, this separation is useful
since it gives the discussion
a better structure.


> > Note that a true supporter and loyal
> > member of some current democratic system
> > could claim that the system already
> > implements PD + RD -> DD (with the help
> > of polls, media, party memberships, open
> > discussion, free organisations,
> > elections, politicians that listen to
> > the opinions). The question is then how
> > strong the arrows ("->") are in each
> case.
> 
>   RD + FS  ->  DD  [not]
> 
> Not true.  Product DD is not a fact.  Any attempt to show
> it by
> argument would die around eqn a.6.  The people of RD do not
> propose
> the laws under which they live, nor do they have a vote in
> them.

But they may influence,
potentially decisively.

> Likewise for the plans and policies of RD.  But no need for
> argument,
> when DD is asserted as a fact of the status quo.  Here are
> two rough
> empirical measures of DD:
> 
> (1) Initiative. Given these:
> 
>   N' potential law, conceived in the mind of a single
> person - but not
>      yet expressed
> 
>   C' potential (max) consensus on the topic of N' -
> but not yet formed
> 
> We must arrive at:
> 
>   C  actual consensus formed on the topic of N'
> 
>   N  actual law, promulgated as a statute
> 
> For a typical person capable of N', how likely is N? 
> Will the person
> even bother to express N'?  Or, at what point will she
> give up?  How
> large, at that point, will be the actual consensus (C) of
> her
> discouraged co-supporters?
> 
> One measure is mean C/C'.  For RD, it is probably close
> to zero.  For
> DD, it should be near to 1.

What makes the ability of one
of the millions of citizens to
influence so strong in the IT
system? I'm sure there will be
competition also in the new
system, just like there are
problems in the old system to
make the politicians approve
what one individual proposes
to some of them.


> (2) Review.  For each law that exists in the statute books
> of the
> state, what is the level of consensus among the people? 
> Likewise for
> each plan that is executed by the state?  Likewise for each
> policy
> that is followed?
> 
> One measure is n(c)/n, where n(c) is the number of
> consensus norms,
> and n is the total number of norms.  For RD, the quantity
> is unknown.
> It is certainly close to zero.  For a mature DD, it should
> be close to
> 1.

In a RD the quantity may be very
different in different societies,
and may also depend heavily on
when and how you ask.

In some societies people may think
that the norms have been agreed
jointly and are worth defending
them and in other societies people
may feel that they were set by
others to support interests that
are not their interests.

I note that one reason why countries
have decided to use RD instead of
DD (in its regular meaning) is that
in some cases the representatives
may know better what norms are good
than regular people. DD may also
mean more populism.


> (III).  Assume a business firm, like Google, wins the IT
> toss.  It
> then monetizes the user interface with advertisements, in
> an attempt
> to recoup its capital investment, and turn a profit.  The
> users
> respond to this by voting up a consensus resolution:
> "No more ads,
> please".  How could the firm respond?

Difficult to say. They might say that
voters can not decide on behalf of
private companies. If Google would
not follow the advice it could lose
popularity. If voters would try to
influence the internal matters of
several enterprises that could lead
to thinking that it is not right to
try to influence independent companies
(or e.g. decisions of private people)
using public IT systems.

Public IT systems could make campaigns
against companies with unwanted
behaviour more efficient than they are
today since distribution of the idea
would be more efficient.


>   1. Fact of monopoly is, IT(GoogleVotes)
> 
>   2. PD(n) demands A(n) = IT(JoeVotes)
> 
> Now what is Google to do?

Don't know. Users love Google today.
If Google plays its cards right people
might love them also in the future.


> Hopefully, the system can adapt to unforseen bumps. 
> There's a
> three-way tension, and any designer's time is going to
> be divided by
> these priorities:
> 
>   1. Design well.
> 
>   2. Deploy fast.
> 
>   3. Look ahead.
> 
> I don't worry so much about 1 and 2 - it's the
> usual professional
> race, and we all just run it - it's what we do.  And I
> don't worry
> about 3 in the sense of running into a blind alley - a bad
> design
> pocket.

The best way to see is to try and see.
There will be bumps. As long as there
is politics there will be conflicting
interests etc.


> > I mentioned the possibility of the chain
> > towards DD being weaker than certain and
> > automatic. The inevitable corruption
> > and/or inclusion of various interests,
> > less than perfect understanding and
> > monitoring etc. is another potential
> > factor that may weaken the system.
> > 
> > At this point I might also mention one
> > more topic that I consider important.
> > That is the role of the chairman and
> > opinion formation in the system. One
> > can not trust IT(p,c) to be a sufficient
> > mechanism to keep the discussion focused
> > and lead to selection of the best
> > formulations of the questions and
> > modelling of the society and topics in
> > question. Better new mechanisms are
> > needed also on that sector.
> 
> Here you diverge from the ideal?  IT(p,c) is rather strong.
>  It says,
> to paraphrase it:
> 
>   IT(p) Anyone can raise a new issue (class of candidates),
> or an
>         option of that issue (instance of candidate)
> 
>   IT(c) If society has the potential of consensus on the
> issue, then
>         actual consensus will be expressed - without
> suppression of
>         dissent

One problem with IT(p,C) is that there
may be millions of issues to decide. In
this situation the chairman or whoever has
the control may influence on which issues
reach the consensus forming level, or to
keep people in the sate of confusion.

One way to keep the issue space nice and
small would be to focus on voting on issues
that already are on the table in the RD
entities (e.g. seats to fill, law proposals
to approve). But this doesn't cover the (p)
part.

Maybe there should be a special mechanism
that would raise the status of individual
initiatives that are interesting to many so
that eventually they reach also the
attention of those voters that do not
follow all the hundreds of initiatives.
Also in this case the final initiative that
makes the issue popular could come from the
media, chairman, party etc. instead of the
individual that made the initial proposal.

We can compare the new system also to the
current system with free speech, polls,
letters to the editor, discussion lists in
the Internet etc. It is not too easy to say
what the crucial new thing that makes the
difference is. Maybe the emergence of a
global (or nationally) dominant easy to use
and well organized IT system would make a
difference?

Juho