[EM] Partisan Politics, or Rising Above It

[Michael Allan]

Juho Laatu wrote:
 
> One approach to modelling the transition
> is to assume that the change to a party
> based system consisted of two transitions,
> Tx and Ty. The (exaggerated) equations
> could look like...

OK, a time series Tx, Ty, ...

> Tx(q = possible, m = good individuals)
> Ty(q = probable, m = bad parties)
> 
> Tx eventually happened, maybe after a
> long struggle. Ty followed easily as the
> next natural step.
>
> The idea is that there is a chain of
> transitions where the last state is the
> most stable state. A transition to an
> idealistic system may lead to transitions
> towards some more pragmatic and often
> even more corrupted systems where the
> value of m gets lower.
>
> Also many stable states are vulnerable in
> the sense that one has to be active in
> order not to let the system slip into a
> bad transition (that is possible and
> probable without continuous monitoring).

This explains the mechanics of how T(p,q) may be independent of T(m).
T is split into a time series, such that Tx(p,q) is temporally
decoupled from Ty(m), and thus causally decoupled too.  Not all of the
transitions are necessarily deliberate (this is the key), and some may
be undesireable:

  Tx(m)  !~=  Ty(m)  for some Tx, Ty   [sometimes]

But all will be more-or-less practical.  And, usually, all will be
probable:

  Tx(p)  ~=  Ty(p)  for all Tx, Ty     [always]

  Tx(q)  ~=  Ty(q)  for all Tx, Ty     [usually]

There is usually a clear path of T(p,q), if we can discern it.  So
it's wise to first appraise T(p,q), and then to judge T(m).

> P.S. One more approach to modelling the
> transitions is to separate interests among
> different interest groups. One could e.g.
> say that (exaggerating again) for lobbyists
> and politicians corruption is a temptation
> but for regular citizens it is a problem.
> That may lead to an interest of the citizens
> to build systems that forbid such corruption
> and that also enforce that stated interest.
> Transitions with sufficient interest are the
> probable (q) ones. In this case the problems
> may also materialize when the citizens give
> the power to their representatives that do
> have somewhat different interests.

(Maybe this comes under T(m), which asks of T, "What are the expected
consequences?  What good?  What evil?")

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/