[EM] Time of trouble? Or put a lid on it? - Premise
Michael Allan
mike at zelea.com
Thu Feb 5 05:54:56 PST 2009
(In this sub-thread 'Premise', we discuss the probability of DD. In
the parent thread, we discuss the danger of it.)
(Reiterating the premise) Where:
DD = direct democracy
FS = free speech
IT = Internet/information technology
PD = public sphere decision-making
RD = representative (modern) democracy
FS is a constitutional fact. IT is a technical fact.
From the original post (section 1), it follows that
PD is probable:
(a) FS + IT ~= PD
Juho Laatu wrote:
> Some new (temporary) definitions:
> PC = public sphere communication
> PO = public sphere opinion-formation
>
> In this framework one could say that
> FS + IT ~= PC
>
> But it is not yet guaranteed that
> PC => PO
But IT includes a voting mechanism.^[1] So assent in PC (agreement
expressed in public) may take the form of a vote. And the summation
of all such votes is formal PO.
Considering only this much, PO is similar to the expression of opinion
in state-run elections. The difference, of course, is it's all done
in public. Example:
I am in discussion with a group (PC). One of the group informs us
of a recently proposed bill (B) that would rewrite the state's
inheritance taxes. She feels strongly about B. As she speaks, I
find myself nodding in agreement with her. I think she's right. So
I take out my mobile phone (IT), and I cast a vote for her (formal
agreement). I trace the vote, and see how it cascades (along with
hers) to some particular consensus draft (B1). I note that B1 is
leading with 30% of the votes, and growing.
That's PO.
> and
> PO => PD
How to distinguish "opinion" from "decision"? (Thinking out loud.) I
guess a decision must be deliberate, in all the senses of that word.
What else must it be? For contrast, consider decision making in
state-run elections:
0700. I wake up. I realize that it's election day. Today, we the
public will decide the issue.
1500. I vote at the polling station.
2000. I turn on my radio. I'm wondering, "What exactly did we the
public decide, today?"
That can't properly be called a "public decision". It's definitely a
decision because it decided an issue. But anything that's blind and
deaf to itself cannot be a public. (Mind, the electorate is not
completely senseless, as it has polsters for feelers.)
There's nothing blind or deaf about PO, of course. The voting is
public, and the results are continuously expressed. The quality of
information goes beyond what's available to the electorate, per se.
I can see clearly: today, B1 has exactly 30% of all votes. I can
trace every one of those votes to an actual person who expressed her
support for B1, exactly as I did. And those people too can see the
same information. We're all aware of *who* we are (collectively),
and *what* we are engaged in doing, even as we proceed to do it.
But if PO is actually to decide an issue (and thus be PD), where is
the issue it decides? Of course, it hasn't happened yet. The
decision must always precede the action. So maybe the only
requirement here is that of intent. It will help if the voter
believes that eqn (b) will generally hold.
Maybe even that is unnecessary. As long as PO is understood as an
*ought* expression (we think the issue *ought* to be resolved thus)
then that will be sufficient to elevate PO to PD. The "ought" implies
an underlying normative basis of decision making by popular assent.
But RD is a fact, and RD rests on just such a norm, which we call
democracy.
Six months later, turnout for B is approaching the level of a
general election. Among its consensus drafts, B2 has climbed to
30%, but B1 has passed 50%. Everyone is talking about it.
In a democratic society, that's a legitimate expression of the public
will. What's more, everyone knows it. That's PD.
(Reiterating the premise, continued)
RD is a constitutional fact. From the original post,
(sections 2 and 3), it follows that DD is probable:
(b) PD + RD ~= DD
> > Note: this is an *effective* DD. The qualification is necessary
> > because the public sphere cannot (by its nature) hold power.
> > Although it can express decisions, it cannot take action on them.
>
> DD and RD are often defined as two
> alternatives. Here DD (= *effective* DD)
> seems to refer to a RD that works as if
> it was a DD (= *actual* DD) because of
> the impact of PD.
Yes, I say "direct democracy" only because of similar effects. I'm
wrong to use that term. Maybe let DD stand, instead, for "decoupled
democracy". What matters is the relation between the people and
government. In a direct democracy, the people *are* the government,
and they hold direct power. Not so in this DD.
The equivalent relation in DD is this: PD from the people (as a
public) is answered by action from the government. The two agents
(people and government) are separate.
(There are non-political relations of PD too, with other parts of
society, and with culture. But we don't have a theory for those,
yet.)
> One possible problem with the equation
> above is that PD may remain as a
> "discussion club" that the RD politicians
> may ignore at the same level as they
> ignore media and poll opinions.
So government does not act on PD, but ignores it. But this is
impossible in RD. PD translates too easily to electoral support in
RD. For example:
Curious to see what my MP is contributing to the bill (B), I trace
her vote. I'm surprised to learn that she's voting for B6, a null
draft of the bill, meaning she's opposed to the whole thing. I put
a filter on the poll results for B, restricting it to my own own
riding. But the results are the same - over 50% of her constituents
are voting in support of B1. And I am one of them.
So I switch over to the poll for my MP's own seat in Parliament.
Sure enough, she's not doing so well there. She's behind two
rivals, both of whom have been gaining in votes lately. (I look to
see how they're voting for B. Sure enough, they're both voting for
B1.) I shift my vote over to one of them. (Maybe my MP is intent
on retiring, and does not wish to be re-elected?)
> If PD is tied more tightly to the
> formal/actual decision making process (RD)
> (to make it stronger than a "discussion
> club") then it becomes part of RD, or maybe
> an *actual* DD. In that case PD is no more
> separated from the power (and the dynamics
> will change accordingly) (I'll skip further
> speculation on this).
I'll first try to separate the parts, and define them clearly.
Otherwise the structure of the whole is lost, and it's difficult to
talk about function. (Afterwards, anyone can argue that the parts are
not actually separate, and I will reply.) We have:
i) public that discusses and expresses decisions (PD)
ii) government that wields power and acts
You say that when (i) and (ii) are aligned, then the public has
exercised power. But it only seems so. There is only a similar
*effect* to what one might expect if the public could actually hold
power - acting by force and threat of force - as a government does, or
as an individual does.
PD is entirely de-coupled from power - in both time and space - and
likewise de-coupled from action. First, the public expresses PD,
tentatively at first - a weak or young consensus. Action follows at a
later time, conditionally. Meanwhile there is a dialogue between the
public decider and the government actor, in which PD is likely to
shift, e.g. in response to the bureaucratic realities of what can
actually be done. At no point will PD be able to force the machinery
of the bureaucracy, and dictate the timing or form of action. Only
the government can do that. So the public holds no power, in any real
sense.
It is true that PD becomes associated with RD. But I wouldn't say it
becomes a structural part of RD, any more than RD becomes a part of
it. I would first emphasize the logical separation of the two systems
as being a more rational way to look at the whole. I think it is also
a more efficient and more feasible way to build it - PD as the
"control system", and RD as the "power system".
> In a way public discussion, media and private
> discussions do set the opinions and they do
> force action, but the chain of consequences
> may be so long and complex that it is not
> possible to master it. The decisions may get
> corrupted and unrecognizable on the way. RD
> and *actual* DD have clear procedures for
> decision making but informal discussions may
> be interpreted in various ways, and PD may
> have alternative competing branches, and as a
> result people (e.g. RD representatives) may
> justify many different decisions/conclusions
> based on the non-uniform non-agreed input.
Informal public opinion is not decision, then. Its effects are too
convoluted to speak clearly of. Agreed. It's like a control system
in a pilotless craft, drifting now with the wind, and now with the
bias of the engines.
Where there is no PD on a particular issue, we can expect no action in
response. Public votes may be split in a stable, 3-way consensus, for
instance. RD will have to muddle along, directionless on that
particular issue. So society reverts to the old way of doing things.
(That's probably good.)
> It is thus also easy to find ways around the
> potentially unwanted PD input and the
> situation may remain much the same as today
> (with FS, free media, influencing via parties
> and other organizations and movements).
But why would elected officials generally wish to oppose PD?
And how could they block action? They could block for a single
term, but likely at the cost of their careers.
(An un-elected upper assembly could block for longer - say for a
couple of decades - depending on its turn-over rate. Likewise the
un-elected judiciary, such as the supreme courts. These would
mitigate the dangers of DD, just as they mitigate the dangers of
democracy, in general.)
> > ... Accepting the probability of DD, what are the dangers ahead?
> > What bad things can happen?
>
> The problem that I referred to above consisted mostly of the
> complexity of a "widely democratized" society...
(will reply shortly, in separate post)
[1] On the voting mechanism, see section 1 of original post. Or:
http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#medium
--
Michael Allan
Toronto, 647-436-4521
http://zelea.com/
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