[EM] Sincere Condorcet Cycles

[Raph Frank]

On Tue, Dec 15, 2009 at 3:31 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
<abd at lomaxdesign.com> wrote:
> Now, consider Deliberative Process as an election method. What would
> deliberative process choose? Quite possibly, the negotiators would toss
> another variable into the mix. Suppose that there is a Clarke tax. Suppose
> that this tax is designed to be the value to each participant of
> optimization of choice. If these are travel distances, it's the cost of that
> travel, paid to each voter, there is a travel subsidy given with the
> proceeds of the tax to those who "lose" the vote, and there is a net tax
> paid by those who "win." (I won't give the details.)

A Clarke tax is only paid if the result is nearly tied (only voters
who's vote changed the result are charged). If the voters have to pay
no matter what, honest is no longer the best strategy.

Your suggestion seems to be more a travel equalisation scheme.

In Ireland, TDs are refunded for costs of travel and accommodation
while attending the Dail.  TDs from "distant" constituencies are given
a larger "mileage" expense.  Obviously, the system is massively abused
(as TDs themselves decide the rules), long time TDs often end up
receiving enough to pay the mortgage of a house in the capital with
the funds.  But in principle, it is a reasonable idea.

>t is about time that the value of iterated voting is
> recognized by voting systems experts. Because it hasn't been valued, top two
> runoff has been neglected and not supported against attack by instant runoff
> voting, which is inflexible and chaotic, as we well know. Top two runoff,
> when the voting method is vote-for-one, is subject to an obvious flaw,
> Center Squeeze, but that is easily fix by using a better method, such as
> Bucklin or Range; if Range is to be used, the method should include an
> explicit approval cutoff (I suggest mid-range).

Well, the second round is a very obvious cost.  Even if IRV is
actually more expensive, it is easier to convince people that 2 rounds
must be more expensive.  Also, it is reasonably likely that top-2 is
more expensive for the winning candidates, in terms of campaign time.

Also, people see value in a decision being made, even if it isn't the
optimal decision.  In principle, for something like the House of
Representatives, this might even be true, as if the seat is not
filled, the State gets less representation.

A compromise would be to add a question to the ballot asking if the
voters agree that the plurality winner should win, and there is no 2nd
round if the majority vote Yes on that option.

Alternatively, voters could indicate which candidates are acceptable
and the election finishes if the plurality winner is acceptable to the
majority.  The 2nd round could be between the plurality winner and the
most approved/accepted candidate, or maybe the election is just
repeated in full.

Also, this breaks the prisoner's dilemma effect of plurality.
http://leastevil.blogspot.com/2009/12/prisoners-moderate-voters-dilemma.html

If supporters of one of the 2 large parties vote for a moderate, then
the other side can betray them and then the other side's favourite
wins.  Thus there is an incentive to defect.

Thus both sides defect; each side only votes for their own candidate.

With the above rule, they could vote for the moderate, and designate
the other party's candidate as non-acceptable.  Thus either the
moderate wins (if the other side cooperates) or the election fails.
This eliminates the prisoner's dilemma effect.

Ofc, using approval directly would be better, but the above method
only requires counting the first choices and then count that
candidate's approval total..

> Note that in some top two runoff implementations, write-in votes continue to
> be allowed in the runoff, which under some conditions fixes, to some extent,
> Center Squeeze, if there is sufficient preference strength in the
> electorate, and with a good method, the possible spoiler effect in the
> runoff can be avoided. TTR with good voting systems is really quite close to
> ideal.

In principle, assuming that write-ins are allowed, the 2nd round could
fail to elect a majority winner too.

A similar effect could be achieved by adding a NOTA option.