[EM] Combined elections

[Raph Frank]

On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 11:16 AM, Juho <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> The method has some
> compromise oriented properties like changing a Condorcet winner to something
> else, but the intent (and reason behind this property) was to just elect the
> best alternative among the combined result alternatives.

It elects the condorcet option.  If it picks ABC over ADE, it is
because a majority prefer ABC.

It is effectively allowing people to trade with other groups.

>> A party could very easily accept an undesired decision in the AvB
>> direction in order to get what it wants in the CvD axis.
>
> Yes, that's what the ratings are used for.

> (Possible new findings after the
> results of the election have been declared final should maybe be ignored.
> Better luck next time :-).)

A tie finder could be useful for defeating an unliked outcome.

For example, if there was a tie

A>B>C>A

and only B and C were found, the B wins.


> Yes, I think there are many questions where a supermajority could be
> required.

What I meant was that supermajorities could be used to eliminate options.

>> I think it might have some strategy problems.
>
> Maybe inherited from the ratings side?? What would that be?

Not 100% sure :), it might be OK since condorcet is used.

If a majority really hate an option, then all wining sets with that
option will have a really low rating.