[EM] Score DSV JQ edit

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

I reread this part:

--- En date de : Dim 30.8.09, Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> a écrit :
> > Ouch. That passage is obviously unclear. I meant
> > "strategy" in the sense of "declared
> > strategy". I was not considering any strategy at all
> > from the actual voters on the ballots they would input
> to
> > Score DSV, but virtual "declared" strategy on the
> > output (imaginary) renormalized ballots, which are
> intended
> > to be equivalent to (the probabilistic average of)
> their
> > strategic Range ballots if their input ballots are
> honest
> > and if they knew the true Smith set but nothing else.
> In
> > other words: if there is a condorcet winner, the
> correct
> > Range strategy for those who know that winner (and
> nothing
> > else) is to vote approval-style for that person and
> all
> > better candidates, thus Score DSV chooses the CW. It
> is a
> > Condorcet method, even though it does not satisfy the
> Smith
> > criterion (if there is no CW, it could potentially
> elect the
> > condorcet loser, if that candidate had a high
> renormalized
> > utility).

When I try again, to understand strategy as something the method is
doing by itself, I see that you want to explain why the CW always wins,
not explain how voters can guarantee that he wins.

I think there's an odd assumption in the method's logic though: What if
the CW is my last choice? It's not obvious that I should start giving 
him votes. Really, when there is only one choice left, my best strategy 
is to stay home!

Kevin Venzke